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Abstract
In this dissertation, I present three essays on the dynamics of intellectual property 
bargaining and trade, particularly of patents. The ﬁrst essay pressents a game theoretic 
model examining the sale of intellectual property rights from small inventors with buy-
ers of varying commercialization capacity across intellectual property rights regimes 
with full and no property rights protection. The essay ﬁnds that in Nash equilibrium 
in both single seller and inﬁnite seller scenarios, sellers generally approach ﬁrms with 
greater commercialization capabilities if property rights are strong, and approach ﬁrms 
with lesser commercialization capabilities if property rights are not protected. The sec-
ond essay examines the sale of patents from small inventors and entities to ﬁrms from 
1992 to 2000. I exploit the 1996 Supreme Court case Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, arguing that patent protection weakened afterwards, to compare patent sales to 
ﬁrms with greater or weaker commercialization capabilities, which I proxy using in-
dustrial patent holdings. Using a conditional ﬁxed-effects multivariate choice model, 
I ﬁnd that patent sales are more highly concentrated towards ﬁrms with weaker patent 
holdings after Markman. The last essay develops a conceptual model of patent dy-
namic capabilities for ﬁrms, developing several predictions in conjunction with the 
technology life-cycle model.
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Chapter 1
Intellectual Property Sales and Property
Rights: Implications for Concentration of
Industry
1.1 Introduction
The market for commercial external innovations, i.e. the purchase, license and
sale of technologies, is a critical source of value for ﬁrms, as it allows ﬁrms to gain
access to technologies for commercialization or for use in expanding their technical
capabilities. A particularly valuable source of such external technology is from in-
dividual or small-scale inventors, who also beneﬁt from the market from technology
as it grants them additional avenues to capture the value of their innovations beyond
self-commercialization.
The bargaining dynamics of inventors or other sellers of intellectual property
(IP) with potential buyers is a well-explored topic in the academic literature, begin-
ning with Arrow (1970). Perhaps the primary issue surrounding the bargaining over
innovations is the paradox of disclosure (Arrow (1962), Anton and Yao (1994)). As-
suming the innovator will not commercialize his invention himself, these innovators
must typically disclose their ideas in order to credibly signal the value of their in-
vention to potential buyers. However, this paradoxically also renders them liable to
expropriation by the very same potential buyers, who can commercialize the technol-
ogy without adequate repayment. Innovators thus face a difﬁcult problem in securing
the best payoff for their invention.
Scholars have suggested several mechanisms by which these small innovators
may capture value from their inventions despite this paradox. Innovators can rely
on public infrastructure and intellectual property regimes, or on various bargaining
2
strategies in the relative absence of such regimes. Of the latter, a signiﬁcant strategy
was suggested by Anton and Yao (1994), who argue that by threatening disclosure
to competing parties, the inventor is able to secure a certain sum from the buyer
even when intellectual property rights have been waived. Otherwise, innovators may
be able to only partially disclose their invention (Anton and Yao (2002)), although
this depends on part upon the nature of the innovation (single technologies, such
as a molecule or a windshield wiper mechanism, may be difﬁcult to disclose only
partially). Finally, Teece (1986) suggests that in weak appropriability regimes, inno-
vators should invest in complementary assets, although this is generally only viable
for innovators that are attempting to commercialize the technology themselves.
The above provides potential solutions for innovators facing a speciﬁc static
scenario of property rights, technology, and buyers the optimal behavior of a stream
of discrete small innovators across different IP regimes is a signiﬁcant research ques-
tion, especially when one takes into account a marketplace of heterogeneous, chang-
ing buyers. Anton and Yao (1994) provides the reasoning behind how innovators can
capture despite the risk of expropriation, but this does not necessarily provide insight
into which ﬁrms the innovator should approach to maximize their return, and how
this might change across different IP regimes.
In this essay, we explore this question of optimal innovator bargaining behavior
across different IP regimes with heterogenous buyers over time. We develop single
and multi-period game-theoretic models for innovator sales in different IP regimes,
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incorporating insights from the management strategy, in particular the concept of ab-
sorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity, pioneered by Cohen and Levinthal (1990)
can be understood as the ﬁrm’s ability to effectively incorporate external technology
effectively - an example of a dynamic capability, i.e. the ﬁrm’s ability to conﬁg-
ure and acquire resources to optimally respond to a changing environment (Teece,
et al (1997)). By incorporating an element of absorptive capacity into the buyers,
we introduce a dynamic element to the market structure - as technologies are pur-
chased and absorbed by ﬁrms over time as new inventors appear with different kinds
of inventions, the ﬁrm’s capabilities (including their absorptive capacities) change,
presenting a developing market to innovators. Intuitively, this reﬂects how incorpo-
rating and commercializing innovations changes ﬁrms, providing funds, assets, and
improving their ability to absorb future technology by expanding the ﬁrm’s knowl-
edge base.
In the model we also consider different types of inventions - major, highly valu-
able innovations or smaller, incremental ones - to both consider how different types
of inventors may approach the market, but also to capture how ﬁrms may alter their
strategies to capture a steady stream of small inventions or wait for the "big ﬁsh."
This distinction is related to an inﬂuential stream of literature on the lifecycle of in-
novation, as pioneered by Tushman and Anderson (1986). Tushman and Anderson
argued that technology follows a life-cycle of "punctuated" equilibria, where signif-
icant, break-through innovations are followed by a stream of less-impactful incre-
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mental innovations that develop the primary disruptive innovation without offering
further fundamental technological advances.
By considering both heterogeneous, changing buyers and a discrete stream of
heterogeneous inventions simultaneously, we are able to capture how ﬁrms can alter
their strategies over time, and alter their response to the arrival of new technologies
based on their own changing characteristics and the value of the invention. The model
thus provides insight not only into optimal bargaining strategy for innovators, but also
suggests how the market may evolve over time. We model the case with a seller with
a valuable IP, which can be categorized as disruptive or incremental. We examine two
settings: those with complete property rights (i.e. full legal protection entitling the
holder of an IP to monopoly protection of all rents arising from such rights) vs. no
property rights (i.e. expropriation is legally allowed, or at least technically feasible)
in both single and inﬁnite-period scenarios.
Our primary result is that over time, given a sufﬁciently low discount rate (that
is, value is discounted more signiﬁcantly by period) we ﬁnd that sales of intellectual
property concentrate in ﬁrms with stronger commercialization capabilities in strong
property rights settings, and diversiﬁes across the ﬁrm with the weaker commercial-
ization capabilities over time in weak property rights settings. The reasoning is as
follows: in strong property rights settings, sellers would approach and sell their IP
to the ﬁrm with greater absorptive capacity as they are able to realize greater levels
of return (due to the above-stated assumption on absorptive capacity giving greater
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commercial returns, as well as full property rights allowing the IP holder full bar-
gaining power) while in weak property rights settings, sellers would approach and
sell their IP to the ﬁrm with weaker absorptive capacity due to the logic as given in
Anton and Yao (1994).
This paper is structured as follows: Section I introduces the research question
and provides an overview of the relevant academic literature and the assumptions
underlying the theory, Section II develops the game-theoretic model, and Section III
provides concluding remarks and a direction for future research.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 One-Period Model
We consider the problem of multiple inventors over time (or a single inventor, in
the one period case) selling intellectual property in regimes of varying property rights
strength. Weak property rights is deﬁned as the environment in which technologies
or invention - when exposed to an entity that does not hold the property right - can be
commercialized by the entity without being required to compensate (or only requiring
little compensation) the holder of the actual property right. Conversely in strong
property rights scenarios, entities cannot commercialize an invention either without
the permission of the rights holder, or without being forced to pay compensation or
some manner of penalty afterwards.
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In both cases we consider the situation of two heterogeneous buyers - a leader
and a laggard. Intuitively, the leader and laggard captures several factors - rather than
just market leadership, the leadership positions captures advantages in technical and
commercialization ability. Consequently, when given a technology, the leader can
earn higher proﬁts than the laggard not only due to an advantageous market position
but also due to its inherent abilities, processes, or assets that allow it to quickly and
effectively commercialize a technology. Further, due to its greater technical resources
and capabilities, the ﬁrm derives greater technological beneﬁts from commercializing
the new invention, leaving it in an even stronger position afterward. As such, the
ability to absorb technology and the ability to commercialize inventions are related,
and we model this connection by having ﬁrms with greater absorptive capacities also
able to realize higher returns from technology.
The correlation of commercialization and absorptive capacities is supported by
several streams of literature. Access to a greater range of resources, such as an ex-
tensive knowledge base encompassing various valuable technologies, can enhance
absorptive capacities (Argote et. al (2003)). Firm assets and commercialization abil-
ity also support internal R& D capability, which in turn enhances technological ab-
sorptive capacity (Veuglers and Cassiman (2002)). Firm size and scope also reduces
search costs.
The above assumptions captures a heterogeneous industry with two ﬁrms of
separate capabilities. To this framework, we also add heterogeneous innovations.
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Each period is deﬁned by the arrival of a new innovation, which can take different
values. This captures the uncertainty and the varying value of innovations - that is,
some are more valuable than others (as a somewhat extreme example, consider the
invention of automobiles versus car seats). Adding this distinction allows ﬁrms to
capture dynamics whereby some innovations are prized more highly over others and
inspire different strategies to capture them.
In this scenario, we consider the arrival of an inventor I with an invention of
value V , which can take one of two values VB > VS . This is treated as a single
"period" - the multiple-period model has multiple inventors appearing over time. In-
tuitively, VB captures major innovations that a signiﬁcant impact upon the market,
offering higher levels of returns over VS , which may be thought of as smaller, in-
cremental innovations. Although this distinction will not play a major role in the
one-period model, it will become signiﬁcant in the inﬁnite-period framework. Intu-
itively we should expect to see incremental innovations occur more frequently than
disruptive innovations. This is captured by deﬁning the probabilites of the innova-
tions as pB > pS > 0, where pB + pS = 1. We assume that in both scenarios of
innovations - big or small - the ﬁrm gains a one-time value from commercializing
any innovation, and does not beneﬁt from a multi-period incremental stream of prof-
its. The value of the major innovation is simply captured as being larger than the
value of the incremental innovation.
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Finally, we also assume that the ﬁrms have a constant stream of self-invention,
from which leaders generate a higher level of returns than laggards. In all cases,
due to this stream of self-invention, leaders generate material beneﬁts from being in
the leadership position - we include this assumption as otherwise, there would be
no beneﬁt to being the "leader" aside from the potential contractual beneﬁts with
the stream of outside inventions. However, intuitively, we would expect the leader
to have beneﬁts from its leadership position beyond laggard. Mathematically, we
describe this by having the leader make CH > CL = 0 every period. We model
CL = 0 for simplicity. This has no effect on the one-period model, as the ﬁrm
position does not change - consequently, the sale of inventions does not affect the
proﬁts of the ﬁrm in one period.
We assume that these internal inventions do not interact with the stream of tech-
nologies from outside inventors, aside from altering a ﬁrm’s cabilities. While future
research may explore how self-invention can result in innovations that pre-empt the
contributions from external innovators, the results would not be signiﬁcantly altered
aside from a redistribution of resources whereby ﬁrms may not acquire inventions in
certain cases as they have already self-invented, creating a new "starting" scenario
where one ﬁrm or another is the leader and one already has access to the innovation.
On the other hand, we assume that the inventor cannot self-realize any proﬁt,
and therefore must approach one of the two ﬁrms to commercialize the innovation
and generate some value from his invention. Before the bargaining process, the in-
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ventor I must choose between sequential and simultaneous bargaining with the two
ﬁrms, and also whether to fully reveal the idea to either party in the course of bar-
gaining. Initially, the value of the invention V is only known to the inventor, although
the inventor can choose to reveal the invention to a ﬁrm, which will also reveal the
value of the invention. The inventor chooses which ﬁrm to approach (the leader,
the laggard, or both). Then, during the bargaining process, the ﬁrms employ a pri-
vate take-it-or-leave-it offer structure for an ex ante contract to decide how proﬁts are
split after the full payoffs have been realized, and then inventor chooses whether to
accept the contract or not. If the inventor does accept the contract, the revelation of
the invention or the existence of a contract between I and any of the buyers is public
information - that is, if I engages in a contract with a ﬁrm, the other ﬁrm is aware of
this.
The ﬁnal realized total proﬁts depends on the parameter of the ﬁrm, the value of
the invention, and the distribution of the ownership of the invention. For instance, if
only the market leader is party to an incremental innovation and executes the project,
the entire realized proﬁt - which would be exclusive proﬁts as only the market leader
has access to the innovation - deﬁned as EHS , and if both ﬁrms have access, the
market leader will make NHS (for "non-exclusive"), with proﬁts similarly deﬁned for
disruptive innovations and market laggards. We assume that E increases in both the
value of the innovation and the market position - that is EiB > E
i
S for any i, and
EHj > E
L
j for any j, and similarly for N .
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We additionally assume that EHS > N
H
k + N
L
k for all j, k - that is, the exclusive
"monopoly" proﬁts always exceed total non-exclusive proﬁts, even if the exclusive
proﬁts are for an incremental innovation and the non-exclusive for a major innova-
tion. Future research may explore a situation where non-exclusive proﬁts for a major
innovation exceeds the exclusive proﬁts of an incremental innovation, although (as
we will see) this primarily has an impact only in the strong property rights scenarios,
allowing innovators to execute contracts with both buyers.
We consider two scenarios - full property rights and no property rights.
Full Property Rights
In the full property rights scenario, inventions do not bear any risk of
expropriation. That is, even if the inventor reveals his invention to a ﬁrm, the ex-
istence of a strong property rights regimes protects the inventor, allowing him to
claim effective ownership of the all rents arising from commercialization of the pro-
tected technologies. Intuitively, this is similar to an industry with strong legal and
patent rights, for example the pharmaceutical industry, which is well-known for hav-
ing strong patent protection for clear, well-deﬁned pharmaceutical compounds. Con-
sequently, the inventor is able to capture a signiﬁcant proportion of the associated
rents of his invention. Further, once a contract has been written between the inno-
vator and a ﬁrm, the rival ﬁrm is required to write an additional contract with the
inventor in order to commercialize the technology itself. However, as the total pay-
offs from a monopoly case exceed the combined total payoffs of duopoly, writing two
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contracts will be value-destroying, and thus disadvantageous to the inventor. Thus,
in effect we will only see monopoly cases.
After realizing the value of his innovation, I must decide whether to engage in
simultaneous or sequential bargaining.
Proposition 1 In the single-period bargaining framework, the inventor I with
intellectual property of value V , will accept the leader’s oﬀered contract of ELV +ε
ex-post (to be paid 0 if non-exclusive scenario results).
Proof. If I chooses sequential bargaining, I must decide which ﬁrm to approach
ﬁrst. Suppose I approaches any ﬁrm and rejects the ﬁrm’s oﬀer. I would then
approach the second ﬁrm - however, knowing that I had approached the ﬁrst
ﬁrm but not negotiated a contract, the second ﬁrm will oﬀer minimal payoﬀs
- just enough to prevent rejection of the contract - to I, because otherwise I
would now earn only 0 proﬁts. Knowing this, the ﬁrst ﬁrm that I approaches
will oﬀer I enough to prevent I from rejecting the contract and resulting in the
scenario listed above. The ﬁrm will thus oﬀer ε > 0 to the inventor, where ε is
arbitrarily small, and I will be forced to take the contract as the alternative is
to earn another inﬁnitesimally small payoﬀ from the other ﬁrm.
However, If I chooses simultaneous bargaining, I will negotiate with both
ﬁrms at the same time. With complete information, at Nash equilibrium, the
market leader will oﬀer ELV + ε, and the laggard oﬀer E
L
V with ε > 0 arbitrarily
small. In other words, the market laggard will oﬀer up to the full value of proﬁts
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from commercializing the invention - as the alternative would be receiving a ﬁnal
payoﬀ of 0 by not commercializing any invention. However, as the market leader
has full information and makes higher potential payoﬀs than the laggard, it will
be able to oﬀer a marginally better contract to persuade the inventor to sell the
invention to the leader instead. As the market laggard cannot aﬀord to outbid
the leader, I will choose the market leader’s contract and accept ELV+ ε.
Thus the ﬁnal Bayesian Nash equilibrium is I choosing to engage in si-
multaneous bargaining, and accepting the market leader’s oﬀer of ELV+ ε.
Intuitively, as the intellectual property regime provides protection over owner-
ship of the invention even despite exposure, the inventor will beneﬁt most by reveal-
ing the invention to both parties and securing the best offer from either ﬁrm, essen-
tially in an open bargaining or bidding framework. Without risk of expropriation, the
inventor has the leisure to secure his best offer.
No Property Rights
In the no-property rights scenario, inventions bear the full risk of expro-
priation. That is, if the inventor reveals his invention to a ﬁrm, the ﬁrm can po-
tentially commercialize the invention without compensating the inventor. Given the
assumption of rational actors, we are assuming that ﬁrms will expropriate if given
the opportunity. Future extensions may incorporate reputational effects, which could
discourage that sort of behavior; however, even despite such reputation costs, there
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are in fact well-documented cases of such expropriation occuring in industry, such
as Ford Motor Company’s expropriation of Robert Kearns’ invention of intermittent
windshield wiper systems or industry-wide use of Gordon Gould’s lasers without
awarding of suitable patents.
The inventor thus must take into account the possibility that his invention will
be taken and commercialized without compensation. Again, he decides whether to
engage in sequential or simultaneous bargaining. As before, there are two ﬁrms, a
leader and a laggard, and both ﬁrms can have access to technology. There are two
situations that can emerge out of the dispersion of technology - either only one ﬁrm
possesses the technology and competes in a monopoly market, or both ﬁrms possess
the technology and compete in a duopoly market.
Proposition 2 In the single-period bargaining framework, an inventor I with
intellectual property of value V will accept the laggard’s oﬀered contract of
receiving payoﬀs of (NHV + ε, 0) in exclusive, non-exclusive cases, respectively.
Proof. If I chooses simultaneous bargaining, then the inventor faces two op-
tions. It can either reveal the invention to verify its value - then both ﬁrms will
have access to the innovation and can commercialize to generate non-exclusive,
”duopoly” proﬁts. Alternatively, I can choose to not reveal his invention and
engage in bargaining around the expected value of the invention. However, in
the case V = VB, I will derive greater proﬁts from pursuing sequential bargain-
ing (as the expected value of V will be less than VB); consequently, if I does
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not disclose his invention, he is signaling that his invention is worth VS. The
inventor could then auction the rights and receive NHS + ε from the laggard (to
prevent deviation).
If I engages in sequential bargaining, the contracting follows the frame-
work developed by Anton and Yao (1994). Suppose I approaches a ﬁrm, reveals
the invention, and negotiates a contract. At the outset, it does not seem the
ﬁrm has any incentive to compensate the inventor for the technology. However,
due to the lack of property rights, the inventor can threaten to deviate - i.e., re-
veal the innovation to the other ﬁrm. This would result in the reduction of the
ﬁrst ﬁrm’s proﬁts from exclusive to non-exclusive levels.
As this would result in a substantial reduction in rents, the ﬁrst ﬁrm will
oﬀer an ex-poste contract - i.e. a contract where payoﬀs are disbursed after
the market has been determined to be a exclusive or a non-exclusive market,
oﬀering zero in the case of the latter, and suﬃcient payment in the exclusive
case to incentivize the inventor from deviating.
From the second ﬁrm’s perspective (i.e. the ﬁrm that currently does not
possess the technology), if only the ﬁrst ﬁrm continues to have access to the
technology, the second ﬁrm will generate 0 proﬁts. Consequently, the second
ﬁrm will be willing to oﬀer up to inﬁnitesimally less than the full payoﬀs it
would receive if it also gains access to the technology - that is, the second ﬁrm
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will pay the full non-exclusive proﬁts it would gain if the inventor deviates. The
ﬁrst ﬁrm will thus pay slightly more than this amount to prevent deviation.
The second ﬁrm will pay NLV if it is the market laggard, and N
H
V if it is the
leader to encourage the inventor to deviate. Consequently, to prevent deviation,
the ﬁrst ﬁrm will pay slightly more than these amounts (which they can aﬀord
to do as all exclusive ”monopoly” payoﬀs are greater than non-exclusive duopoly
payoﬀs).
As NHV > N
L
V , the inventor will earn greater payoﬀ from the ﬁrst ﬁrm
preventing deviation if the second ﬁrm is the leader. Consequently, the innovator
will approach the market laggard for its contract, earning NHV + ε from the
laggard if it does not deviate, and NHV from the leader if it does deviate - a
rational innovator will thus choose not to deviate.1
Intuitively, the laggard ﬁrm will have to pay a greater amount to the inventor as
the leader can afford to pay a greater amount to the inventor to deviate and disclose
his idea. One can think of the laggard as essentially being forced by its weaker
position into paying more to the inventor in an effort to maintain exclusive access to
the innovation. Thus, in the Nash equilibrium the inventor will approach the laggard.
1 The model is a simpliﬁed version of the one contained in Anton and Yao (1994) that does not allow
self-invention. As such, we are assuming that the court cannot infer that if a ﬁrm uses the invention,
the source of the invention was the inventor.
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1.2.2 Inﬁnite-Period Model
We extend the model to inﬁnite periods. This better reﬂects the strategic behav-
ior of ﬁrms in the market, who face a stream of inventions instead of a single one.
The inventions, when executed, also affects the ﬁrm’s commercialization ability, ei-
ther catapulting it into a position of leader or maintaining the ﬁrm’s current position,
depending on the disposition of the technology and the ﬁrm’s characteristics.
As stated above, there are two types of innovation that appear in the market-
place - large, highly valuable and smaller, incremental innovations. These innova-
tions impact ﬁrms in different ways when absorbed and commercialized. In our
model, incremental innovations, as suggested by their name, do not signiﬁcantly im-
pact the ﬁrm’s characteristics and result in lower payoffs than disruptive innovations.
On the other hand, disruptive innovations are signiﬁcant - not only do they offer
higher payoffs from commercialization, developing a disruptive innovations can en-
hance ﬁrms’ technical abilities and turn it into the leader in the next period. This
gives the ﬁrm access to higher payoffs from innovations, both externally and from its
own internal stream of innovations.
We model this as follows. When V = VS , when the innovation is commer-
cialized, the characteristics of the ﬁrm do not change. That is, if the innovation is
commercialized laggard ﬁrms remain laggard, and leader ﬁrms remain leader. When
V = VB, however, laggard ﬁrms have the opportunity to become the leader - if
the laggard commercializes the technology, it gains enough knowledge and captures
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enough of the market to become the new leader in the next period (as it requires com-
mercialization to fully absorb the technology and develop the capabilities to become
leader). Critically, we assume that ﬁrms do not become leaders if they commer-
cialize sufﬁcient incremental innovations. To a certain extent, this reﬂects how the
inventions are very small, but future research would consider how a certain level of
incremental innovations can enhance a ﬁrm’s capabilities to become the leader, intro-
ducing the potential whereby a ﬁrm can "wait out" large innovations and become the
leader by accumulating smaller ones. However, by assuming sufﬁcient "technologi-
cal decay", as discussed below, a large discout rate, or a relatively small value of the
incremental innovations, the assumption is strong, but potentially not unreasonable.
On the other hand, while leader ﬁrms do not change their position, although
they make an accordingly higher level of payoff from commercializing the invention
itself. As leaders, they maintain their leadership position. Intuitively, this reﬂects
"technological decay" - i.e. how after the initial advantage rendered by a disruptive
innovation, the competitive advantage erodes as incremental innovations diffuse over
time until ﬁrms can be again compete equitably after one disruptive innovation. Ex-
tensions to the model may explore changing the extent to which leaders can beneﬁt
from acquiring a valuable technology, although to a certain extent the advantages can
be captured by the difference between EHB and E
L
S . If both ﬁrms commercialize the
disruptive innovation, the leader is able to maintain its competitive advantage and
remain the leader in the next period.
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A key assumption is that different inventors appear over time, instead of the
same inventor re-appearing with new inventions. If the latter were the case, ﬁrms
could theoretically write a long-term contract with the inventor. However, one can
consider that the lifetime inventions generated by the inventor could be captured
(using a net-present discounted value) using a suitable V .
Lastly, the internal stream of innovations CH has an impact upon the model.
Whereas in the model with a single inventor the internal innovation stream did not af-
fect bargaining (as the proﬁts from the internal stream only realize proﬁts in the next
period), in the framework with inﬁnite inventors, this stream has an impact. Intro-
ducing the beneﬁt to remaining the leader satisﬁes intuition, as well as controlling,
to a certain extent, for the strategy whereby a laggard ﬁrm actively seeks to main-
tain its laggard status to gain access to a proﬁtable stream of incremental external
innovations.
Finally we add a discount factor, expressed as β ∈ (0, 1). The discount rate
factors once per period - for example, if two periods pass proﬁts are discounted by a
factor of β2.
Full Property Rights
In the inﬁnite-period case, in any given period, ex-ante to the value of the in-
vention being realized, the game is equivalent to any other period. There is a leader
and a laggard, given probability of inventions of a certain type appearing, and inﬁnite
periods remaining in the future.
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Proposition 3 In an inﬁnite-period bargaining framework, It, period t’s inven-
tor with an innovation of value Vt will engage in simultaneous bargaining and
accept the leader’s oﬀered contract of ELV + ε if the innovation is incremental,
and ELV +β(H−L)+ε if the innovation is disruptive, where H as the net present
value of all expected proﬁts (after payments to inventors) over inﬁnite periods
for the current leader, and L as the net present value of all expected proﬁts for
the current laggard.
Proof. AssumeH>L.
The Nash equilibrium is as follows. For It the game is a single-period
game, as he does not reappear in the market after selling his ﬁrst invention.
Consequently, after the inventor privately realizes the value of his innovation,
he engages in simultaneous bargaining, reﬂecting the one-period scenario above.
If the innovation is incremental, then the logic is the same as in the one-
period case. This is because incremental inventions cannot aﬀect ﬁrm charac-
teristics - which means there is no potential future advantages to capturing the
current-period innovation. All bargaining is limited to payoﬀs directly arising
from the commercialization of the innovation in the single-period. Thus, the
leader will oﬀer ELS + ε to the innovator and solely commercialize the invention.
However, if the innovation is disruptive, then contrary to the one-period
case the laggard can potentially oﬀer higher payoﬀs from the discounted future
payoﬀs by becoming the leader in the next period. The laggard would thus
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be willing to oﬀer as high as ELB + β(H − L) - that is, the full value of the
additional beneﬁts that the ﬁrm would receive by commercializing the disruptive
innovation and becoming the leader. This is derived as follows: if the current
laggard solely commercializes the invention, then it receives ELB + βH. If it
chooses not to commercialize the invention, it remains the laggard and receives
βL. The excess is thus ELB + β(H − L).
It also is important to note the internal innovations if the current period -
that is CH and CL - would not impact the bargaining dynamics. This is because
of two reasons: ﬁrst, the inventor does not have the ability to alter current-period
payoﬀs of the internal innovation stream, and second, the alteration in the ﬁrm’s
capabilities occurs at the end of the current period. Thus, as the laggard would
not become a leader until the next period, the current period payoﬀs from
internal innovations is CL, i.e. 0. In sum, the payoﬀs from current-period
internal innovations are not aﬀected by the sale of the invention, and thus does
not enter into the bargaining.
Despite the additional value that the laggard can oﬀer the inventor due
to the excess potential payoﬀs it receives from becoming the leader in the next
period, the current-period leader can always exceed the laggard’s oﬀer, as EHB +
β(H−L) > ELB+β(H−L). Consequently, the leader will oﬀer ELB+β(H−L)+ε
and win the innovation.
The leader will thus win the innovation in all periods. Consequently, L, the
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discounted payoﬀs across all periods for the laggard, is 0. H can be calculated
using the following identity: H is equivalent to the expected value of payoﬀs
from current period added to the discounted payoﬀs from the future, i.e. βH.
In other words, H = pB[E
H
B −(ELB+β(H−L))]+pS[EHS −ELS ]+CH+βH.
Given that pB+pS = 1, and L = 0, we can calculateH =
1
1−(1−pB)β [pB(E
H
B−
ELB) + pS(E
H
S − ELS ) + CH ]. Thus, H > L.
The leader thus gains all innovations.
Intuitively, as there is greater value to be gained in the disruptive innovation
case from becoming the leader, the leader is forced to pay a higher amount to the
disruptive innovator to out-compete the laggard. Consequently, disruptive innovators
gain higher payoffs from their invention, as would be expected - however, the in-
crease in payoffs exceeds even the extent to which disruptive technology monopoly
proﬁts exceed incremental monopoly proﬁts - the disruptive technology also offers
the potential for leadership, which offers signiﬁcant value in its own right.
No Property Rights
Proposition 4 In an inﬁnite-period bargaining framework (whereby an inﬁnite
stream of discrete inventors approach with unique inventions - each invention is
viewed as a separate period), It, period t’s innovator with an innovation of value
Vt will engage in sequential bargaining and accept the laggard’s oﬀered contract
of (NHS + ε, 0) in cases of exclusive and non-exclusive markets, respectively, if
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the innovation is incremental. If the innovation is a major one, the innovator
will accept the laggard’s oﬀered contract of (NHB +β(H −L)+ ε, 0) in the cases
of exclusive and non-exclusive markets, respectively
Proof. Once again, the game in any single period, ex-ante to the revelation
of the invention value, is equivalent to the game in any other period. There
will always be inﬁnite periods remaining, one ﬁrm will have the competitive
advantage, and the value of the invention will be drawn from the same binomial
distribution of incremental and disruptive innovations.
In all cases, the inventor will pursue a sequential bargaining structure as, if
the innovation is revealed to both ﬁrms, neither has an incentive to compensate
the inventor. This is because there is no further agency or bargaining power
available to the inventor if complete relevation has occured, as he can no longer
inﬂuence the eﬀective payoﬀs of the ﬁrms.
Again, we deﬁne H as the net present value of all discounted expected pay-
oﬀs (after payments to inventors) across inﬁnite periods for the current leader,
and L as the net present value of all discounted expected payoﬀs across inﬁnite
periods for the current laggard.
We take any given period t. If the invention is incremental, then neither
the laggard nor the leader will change its market position if the ﬁrm commer-
cializes the intellectual property. The game is then equivalent to the one-period
case, as neither ﬁrm is incentivized to oﬀer more than the direct monopoly or
23
duopoly proﬁts arising from executing the technology. That is, as the technol-
ogy does not inﬂuence ﬁrm characteristics and thus future payoﬀs, bargaining
will be limited to competing around direct market rents. The laggard will thus
oﬀer (NHS + ε, 0) to the period t inventor in the exclusive and non-exclusive cases
respectively, similar to the one-period no-property rights case analyzed above.
However, if the invention is a major and not an incremental innovation,
the game becomes more complex.
As with the single-period case, the inventor will again engage in sequential
bargaining, as general diﬀusion of the innovation eliminates all bargaining power
on the side of the inventor. Assuming payoﬀs are greater than zero, the ﬁrst ﬁrm
approached will pay the potential duopoly proﬁts of the other ﬁrm to prevent
deviation. We will examine two cases: L > H and H > L.
Case A: H>L.
If the inventor approaches the leader, the leader would be willing to com-
pensate the innovator if and only if EHB + βH − P > NHB + βH, where P is the
payment to the innovator: Again, EHB + β(H − L) − P represents the excess
payoﬀs to the ﬁrm of not purchasing and commercializing the innovation - this
is compared to non-exclusive proﬁts where both ﬁrms commercialize.
The laggard would be willing to oﬀerNLB+β(H−L) to encourage deviation,
meaning the leader will have to compensate the inventor NLB + β(H − L)+ ε
to discourage deviation and sale of the invention to the laggard ﬁrm. While
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EHB + β(H − L) − P = EHB− NLB − ε is indeed greater than NHB , due to the
assumption that exclusive-market proﬁts exceed combine non-exclusive market
proﬁts - the inventor would actually ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to approach the
laggard and receive NHB +β(H−L) from the laggard, instead of NLB +β(H−L)
from the leader
Then, the laggard receives the external innovations whether they are in-
cremental or disruptive, competing as a monopolist for the period. We then
calculate H = pB[ C
H + βL] + pS[C
H + βH] - that is, in both cases the leader
receives the beneﬁt from the internal innovation stream, becoming the laggard
when the external innovation is a major one and remaining the leader if the ex-
ternal innovation is incremental. We can then calculate H = 1
1−pSβ [C
H+pBβL].
Then H > L if and only if 1
1−βC
H > L.
Similarly, L can be calculated as follows: L = pB[E
L
B− (NHB +β(H−L))+
βH]+pS[E
L
S −NHS +βL]. Given that pB+ pS = 1, we can simplify the expression
to deduce:
L = 1
1−β [pB(E
L
B −NHB )+ pS(ELS −NHS )]. Consequently, H > L if and only
if CH > pB(E
L
B−NHB )+pS(ELS −NHS ). Intuitively, if the single-period payoﬀ for
the leader’s internal innovation exceeds the payoﬀ for the laggard”s innovation
with the expected value of the one-period ”payoﬀ value” of the innovation, then
the equilibrium holds. That is, the internal innovation stream is suﬃciently
high to support the long-term beneﬁt of being a leader over the laggard.
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Case B: L>H
This case increases greatly in complexity. We analyze two sub-cases: if the
inventor approaches the laggard ﬁrst, or if the inventor approaches the leader
ﬁrst.
Case 1: If the inventor ﬁrst approaches the leader, the leader would com-
mercialize if and only if EHB + β(H − L)− P > 0, that is, if the potential extra
beneﬁts from commercializing the technology exceeds the price paid. Seeing
the disclosure of the innovation to the leader, the laggard would oﬀer its full
additional proﬁts from receiving the major innovation to encourage deviation -
namely, NLB + β(H − L). However, as we have assumed H < L, β(H − L) < 0,
there is the possibility that NLB + β(H − L) < 0 - in which case the laggard
would not be willing to pay the inventor to deviate as it would result in a net
decrease in payoﬀs. Given that deviation is not a credible threat, the leader
will then only pay a minimal amount to the inventor - just enough to per-
suade it to sell the invention - and receive the innovation, remaining the leader.
However, if NHB +β(H−L) > 0, then the inventor will be compensated if it ap-
proaches the laggard ﬁrm. Consequently, this equilibrium holds if and only if
NHB + β(H − L) < 0.
However, if NLB+β(H−L) > 0, then the leader will pay NLB+β(H−L) to
the inventor to prevent deviation. In this case, NHB +β(H−L) > NLB+β(H−L)
> 0 - that is, the leader would be willing to pay more for deviation than the
26
laggard in the same scenario. Thus, if NLB + β(H − L) > 0 - that is, if the
laggard ﬁnds it valuable to commercialize the technology in a duopoly scenario
- the inventor would approach the laggard instead.
Consequently, the assumptions of Case 1 (i.e. that the rational inventor
would approach the leader) hold if and only if NHB + β(H − L) < 0, in which
case the innovator will only be compensated a minimal amount.
In other words, if the inventor approaches the leader it will either make
minimal proﬁt or ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to approach the laggard instead. Know-
ing this, the rational inventor would either be indiﬀerent or ﬁnd it more valuable
to approach the laggard, so long as the laggard ﬁnds it worthwhile to comercial-
ize the technology - that is, if NLB +β(H−L) > 0. In other words, approaching
the leader is weakly dominated by approaching the laggard - so we may consider
only the case of approaching the laggard except when ELB < β(L−H). In this
case, the laggard will always remain the laggard, and the leader always remain
the leader - the leader will receive all disruptive innovations and the laggard all
incremental innovations
Then, H = pB[C
H + EHB + βH] + pS[C
H + βH], and
L = pB[βL]+pS[E
H
S −NHS +βL]. We can simplify these expressions to ﬁnd
H = 1
1−β [C
H + pBE
H
B ], and L =
1
1−β [pS(E
L
S −NHS )]. Then H < L if and only if
CH + pBE
H
B < pS(E
L
S −NHS ). However, as CH > 0 and EHB > ELS > ELS −NHS ,
the inequality holds only under fairly extreme conditions for pB. We must have
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pB <
ELS−NHS −CH
EHB+E
L
S−NHS
, and ELB <
β
1−β [pS(E
L
S − NHS ) − pBELB − CH ] simultaneously.
The second inequality holds only if 1 < β(1 + pB), as otherwise we would have
1−β
1−β(1+pS)E
L
B less than a negative value. If the inequality holds, we can simplify
to ELB >
β(1−β)
β(1+pS)−1 [pSN
H
S + pBE
H
B + C
B], which is a decreasing function of
pB = 1− pS.
Therefore, this condition holds under rather extreme conditions - that is,
if pB is very low.
Case 2: If the inventor ﬁrst approaches the laggard ﬁrm, the current leader
would oﬀer its full additional proﬁts from receiving the disruptive innovation
than it would receive if it does not receive the innovation (becoming the laggard
in future periods). Further, the laggard would only execute the innovation if
the value it receives from commercializing exceeds the value it receives from
”deferring” and remaining the laggard. This would only happen if ELB + β(H −
L)−P > 0. However, as we have assumed β(H−L) < 0, there is the possibility
that ELB+β(H−L)−P < 0, i.e. the payoﬀs from commercializing the disruptive
innovation this period is actually less than the discounted payoﬀs by ”deferring”
and becoming the laggard in the following period, which
Case 2.a) Assume that the laggard would not commercialize - that is,
ELB +β(H−L)−P < 0. Then, the inventor would not receive any payoﬀs from
the laggard, and would receive no payoﬀs at all as neither ﬁrm would be willing
to compensate the inventor after the initial disclosure - the inventor then has
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no ability to threaten defection and diﬀusion of the technology. Knowing this,
a rational inventor would instead approach the leader ﬁrst, contradicting the
assumption of Case 2. We thus move on to the case where the laggard would
commercialize.
Case 2.b) Now, we examine the case where the laggard would actually
commercialize - that is, if ELB + β(H − L) − P > 0. Then, mathematically,
the leader would oﬀer P = max(NHB + β(H − L), 0) to the inventor to try and
encourage deviation.
Then, if NHB < β(L−H), the ﬁrm would not be willing to oﬀer anything
to deviate - it would rather defer the invention, and wait to become the laggard
in the next period. The inventor would then not be paid by the leader for
deviation, as there would be no value to commercializing the inventiton in the
duopoly state. Then, the laggard will only compensate the inventor a minimal
amount to persuade it to sell the invention.
On the other hand, if NHB > β(L−H), the leader will oﬀer NHB +β(H−L)
to incentivize deviation. Then, the laggard will pay NHB + β(H −L) + ε. Given
that NHB + β(H − L) + ε > NLB + β(H − L) + ε, the inventor will approach the
laggard, similar to the single-period case. In this case, the laggard will receive
the invention in all periods, and we can calculate H and L.
The calculation is now identical to the Case A scenario. Thus, H = pB[
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CH +βL] + pS[C
H +βH], and L = pB[E
L
B − (NHB +β(H−L))+βH] + pS[ELS −
NHS + βL], and H < L if and only if C
H < pB(E
L
B −NHB ) + pS(ELS − EHS ).
Evaluating all the subcases, we thus conclude that the laggard receives all
innovations if CH > pB(E
L
B − NHB ) + pS(ELS − NHS ). Otherwise, the inventor
would only earn minimal returns unless NHB > β(L − H), where L − H =
1
1−β [pB(E
L
B −NHB ) + pS(ELS −NHS )]− 11−pSβ [CH + pBβL]
In intuitive terms the basic logic of the above proof is similar to the single-
period case for no-property rights scenarios. However, a new tension arises from the
following. Although leaders generate more valuable internal innovations and gen-
erate higher payoffs when absorbing external innovation, laggards win both major
and incremental innovations in Nash equilibrium (because approaching the laggards
is a weakly dominant strategy for the inventor). Consequently, ﬁrms face a tradeoff
between the stream of incremental innovations and the chance to win a major in-
novation versus the stream of internal innovations that ﬁrms can earn by becoming
the leader. Depending on the distribution of the values of commercializing external
and internal technologies, the inventor may earn only minimal returns to his technol-
ogy. In one extreme case, if the payoffs from commercializing the major technology
for the laggard is very low, then the laggard would actually ﬁnd it preferable to "de-
fer" commercializing the disruptive technology in favor of remaining the laggard.
However, again this relies upon very low monopoly payoffs from commercializing a
disruptive technology - a somewhat unrealistic assumption.
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The scenarios where payoffs to the inventors are non-trivial take two primary
forms: either the value of the internal technology stream of the leaders is sufﬁciently
high to ensure sale of disruptive inventions, or the leader earns enough proﬁts in
hypothetical duopoly scenarios to consider purchasing deviation if the innovator ap-
proaches the laggard. In other words, disruptive innovators are paid when being the
leader is "valuable enough" to pre-empt deferral or make deviation an empty threat.
There is one scenario where innovators would approach the leader in the no-property
rights scenario - that is, when the current innovation is disruptive and the probabil-
ity of future disruptive innovations is extremely low. However, the equilibrium ﬁnds
that even when disruptive inventors would not capture a high level of rents from their
innovations, they would still sell their ideas to the laggard in all periods, except for
the extreme case mentioned above.
1.3 Discussion
The above model includes some assumptions that may be extended or altered
in future research. We discuss how the results may not fully reﬂect the reality of
innovation markets, how the model may be extended in future research, and how the
results may otherwise be subjected to tests to develop an intuition for the robustness
of the results.
First, we have currently assumed only two potential buyers of intellectual prop-
erty in the market. This is not necessarily an accurate reﬂection of reality, as ﬁrms
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are always entering and leaving technological areas, and inventors may have access
to a higher number of sellers. However, extending to a higher number of buyers will
not necessarily alter the results or reasoning. In the complete property rights case,
the inventor can still employ an open bargaining framework and sell his invention to
the ﬁrm that can afford to outbid all other competitors - which would be the "leader"
as characterized by its ability to commercialize intellectual property rights. In the
no-property rights scenario, the inventor will again threaten diffusion to bargain with
the potential seller. To maximize returns, the inventor would approach a ﬁrm that
would pay greater amounts to prevent deviation. This would not be the leading ﬁrm -
the leading ﬁrm would pay the highest amount to encourage deviation, so rival ﬁrms
would be forced to pay greater amounts to prevent this. An interesting wrinkle arises
if non-duopoly (i.e. oligopolistic) proﬁts exceed duopolist-scenario payoffs, allowing
inventors to diffuse the innovation across multiple potential buyers. However, this is
a relatively unrealistic scenario, as total economic rents are destroyed as more com-
petitors enter the market and push the market to perfect competition. Lower numbers
of buyers is also not necessarily highly unrealistic from the inventor’s perspective, as
search and exposure costs for inventors looking to their commercialization invention
can be signiﬁcant, causing inventors to be aware of only a small number of potential
buyers.
Another interesting potential extension arises from incorporating "weak" prop-
erty rights instead of examining only full or no property rights. Weak property rights
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could potentailly be examined by modeling rights-holders as being able to capture a
certain fraction of rents generated by the commercializer when expropriation occurs
- we can then develop a spectrum of property rights regimes. However, in the equi-
libria deﬁned above, expropriation does not actually occur. The existence of limited
property rights essentially guarantees a minimum level of return to the innovator - if
the proportion is sufﬁciently high the proportion of monopoly rights generated by the
expropriator may exceed duopoly proﬁts offered by the ﬁrm not approached. In this
case, expropriation is actually encouraged - or rather, essentially an unofﬁcial con-
tract occurs where the monopolist compensates the inventor. Then, this is essentially
similar to the full property rights case.
There are alternative methods to reﬂect weak property rights or the nature of in-
novation that more fundamentally alter the dynamics. For instance, the model could
incorporate a litigation sub-game, where if expropriation occurs innovators could
pay a certain cost to a legal counsel in return for a probability of compensation. The
model may also be extended to include reputational effects, where ﬁrms that repeat-
edly expropriate become known for this behavior. As mentioned above, the equi-
librium does not actually include expropriation. However, the reputation structure
would result in costs to the ﬁrm from expropriating behavior.
We may also include partial disclosure of innovation akin to Anton and Yao
(2008), whereby the inventor can target a certain level of intended disclosure, but
with a certain probability risk complete disclosure. If the invention is fully revealed,
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the situation is identical to the full property rights scenario - the leader will out-
offer the laggard, who will offer his full rents from gaining access to the innovation.
However, in order to avoid deviation from the inventor after the innovation has been
fully revealed to the leader, the leader will have to offer an ex-poste contract where
compensation is paid after market structure has been realized. If full disclosure is
avoided, however, the inventor may be able to target a level of disclosure whereby
value is telegraphed but not fully disclosed, resulting in a scenario similar to the
full-property rights case.
Currently, the model considers internal innovations as entirely separate from
external technologies. However, the model may have scenarios where the same in-
novation is developed by the ﬁrm as with the external ﬁrm. If both ﬁrms have self-
invented, then the innovator would not be able to realize any proﬁts. however, if one
ﬁrm already has the invention, the innovator would only be able to earn income from
threatening diffusion to the ﬁrm that does not currently possess the innovation. In
full property rights cases, the current invention-holder would pay the duopoly proﬁts
that the competitor would earn if it also gained access - identical to the bargaining in
the low property-rights case. Depending on which ﬁrm has self-innovated, the inno-
vator could approach the leader or the laggard. Intuitively the leader would be more
likely to self-innovate - consequently, becoming the leader is more attractive even in
no-property rights scenarios, and "deferral" strategies, as discussed above, would be
less likely to occur on the part of the laggard. Finally, an interesting extension could
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incorporate strategic choice in internal R&D investment, in other words where ﬁrms
can increase spending to either increase the internal innovation value or potentially
increase the rate of self-innovating. In this case, we may ﬁnd that in weak property
rights scenarios, current leader ﬁrms would ﬁnd it more valuable to invest internally
in R&D over purchasing external innovations.
Finally, as discussed brieﬂy above, if innovators enter the marketplace repeat-
edly and are not limited to only one innovation, then ﬁrms can develop long-term
contracts around them. In this case, the innovator is essentially brought in-house,
contributing to the internal stream of innovation. After time, the innovator would de-
velop a reputation for quality, reducing the need for disclosure to verify the value of
the invention, moving the bargaining closer to a full property rights scenario.
1.4 Conclusion
In this essay, we develop a game-theoretic model for the sale of intellectual
property rights from small, independent inventors to ﬁrms in strong and weak prop-
erty rights. We consider this scenario with the addition of dynamically heterogeneous
ﬁrms, where technical and commercialization ability, encompassing its technological
absorptive capacity, change depending on whether certain technologies are incorpo-
rated and commercialized. We ﬁnd that, given certain conditions, in both the single
and inﬁnite-period cases, the inventor would sell his innovation to the leader if prop-
erty rights offer full protection, and to the laggard if property rights do not offer any
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protection. The inﬁnite-period result holds when either the internal innovation stream
is sufﬁciently valuable for leaders, or if the probability of disruptive innovations is
very low.
We considered possible future research, although intuitively the result is fairly
robust against various extensions, such as including multiple potential buyers and
considering "weak" instead of no property rights. The results thus suggest divergent
equilibria across different property rights scenarios, and has implications for how
innovators may approach the sale of their intellectual property depending on ﬁrm
characteristics and variable property rights.
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Chapter 2
Selling to the Leader or the Laggard?
Exploring the Impact of Property Rights
Upon Innovator Patent Sales
2.1 Introduction
The market for innovation, i.e. the buying, licensing and sale of patents, is a crit-
ical value-driver for ﬁrms and inventors, whether it allows ﬁrms to acquire patents
to gain access to commercializable technology and protect their existing innovations,
or whether it facilitates commercialization of existing stock of patents via selling or
licensing. Particularly since the mid-1980s, the United States has seen a dramatic
surge in patent activity, from ﬁling to transfer to licensing. Stories of multi-million,
sometimes multi-billion dollar purchases of patent portfolios routinely cross head-
lines.But the dynamics of patent sales faces many frictions and transactions costs.
As such, it is difﬁcult to predict the impact of changing property rights upon the
movement of patents and innovation.
The literature suggests many reasons ﬁrms acquire patents, and often exam-
ines the issue as a decision in context of the ﬁrm’s strategy as to whether to acquire
a patent or not (Somaya (2012), Duysters and Hagedoorn (2000), Anton and Yao
(2004)). However, the decision of the seller facing a heterogeneous marketplace of
buyers has been relatively less examined - particularly in a dynamically changing en-
vironment. In this paper, I explore the following question: how do small innovators
or sellers of patents alter their strategies in environments with weakening property
rights?
To capture such changes in the environment, I exploit that patents are inherently
legal documents. Depending upon the strength or weakness of the appropriability
38
regime - that is, the legal environmental factors determining the ease of infringement
or imitation of a commercializable intellectual property - optimal ﬁrm and inventor
strategies for the sale, acquisition, and implementation of patents can change signif-
icantly. In particular, I use Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370
(1996) - a landmark Supreme Court case whereby courts, especially the Court of Ap-
peals, Federal Circuit (or CAFC, established in 1982), were given a higher level of
jurisidiction over a given patent’s claims, i.e. the scope of protection offered by the
patent. This had the effect of weakening property rights for several reasons, includ-
ing the granting of greater oversight to judges over juries, who tended to be more
inventor-friendly (juries ruled for patent-holders 68 percent of the time, opposed to
judge’s 51 percent (Moore (2000))).
Using a dataset of patent trades from 1992 to 2000 gathered by the USPTO,
I examine the impact of Markman v. Westview Instruments upon patent trading pat-
terns, particularly from small-scale or individual inventors to larger ﬁrms. I use a
conditional ﬁxed-effects multivariate choice regression to determine the impact of a
potential patent buyer’s commercialization capabilities, measured as patent holdings
in a given time frame and the same industry, as deﬁned by the as the patent being
traded.
The primary result is that after Markman v. Westview Instruments - that is, af-
ter patent strength was weakened - inventors and small entities are more likely to sell
patents to ﬁrms with lower commercialization capabilities. This result has implica-
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tions for both sellers and buyers of patents, in terms of maximizing the payoff from
external payoffs for their inventions, and optimizing strategy to acquire external in-
novations instead of conducting internal R&D dpeending on the strength of property
rights, respectively. The redistribution of value-generating innovations is also impor-
tant for policy makers, as they may ﬁnd that - contrary to intuition, strong property
rights results in the concentration of property rights over time.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the research question
and explores relevant literature. Section 3 explains the data, presenting stylized facts.
Section 4 discusses the methodology for empirical estimation. Section 5 presents
the estimation results, in particular the impact of Markman v. Westview Instruments
upon the pattern of sales activity from inventors to large ﬁrms, and discusses potential
explanation. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Motivation
This paper sits at the juncture of two strands of thought: one from management
science, regarding the market for intellectual property (IP) and its interaction with
appropriability regimes, and the other from the legal literature regarding patent court
rulings, particularly the impact of Markman v. Westview Instruments.
2.2.1 The Market for Patents
Academics have examined multiple reasons that ﬁrms acquire patents. Companies
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may desire the proprietary value of the patent, i.e. the direct technological value of
the innovation underlying the patent (Somaya (2012)), to expand their existing tech-
nological capabilities or to develop and commercialize new technologies (Duysters
and Hagedoorn (2000)). Firms may also acquire patents for their defensive value, or
the patent’s ability to prevent erosion of rents from holdup or litigation by outside
entities holding patents that may prevent commercialization. Finally, ﬁrms may wish
to acquire patents for their licensing revenue or for indirect beneﬁts, such as access
to cross-licenses or nonmarket strategic value from competitors developing products
based upon the same underlying technologies (Arora, Fosfuri (2003)).
On the other hand there are signiﬁcant costs and frictions that arise from tech-
nology transfer, both in terms of direct transfer costs (Teece (1977)) and transac-
tions costs arising from appropriation, expropriation, and hold-up (Teece (1986),
Williamson (1991), Anton and Yao (1994), Shapiro (2001)). These problems are
exacerbated in weak property rights regimes. While patents provide a potential le-
gal mechanism where innovators may protect their invention, patents are imperfect
defensive instruments as they can be fuzzy or imprecise, (Linden & Somaya (2003),
Teece, (2000)), "invented around," (Mansﬁeld, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981)), and
expensive to litigate if expropriated (assuming infringement is detected at all) (En-
caoua and Lefouili (2005), Shane and Somaya (2007)).
In response, ﬁrms have developed a variety of countermeasures. In industries
with weaker property regimes, ﬁrms often construct patent portfolios or "thickets,"
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using overlapping claims to bolster the defense of a critical technology. Or, they may
cooperate with other ﬁrms to build patent pools, where each member contributes
patents from which all other members can draw, or alternatively cross-license across
a broad variety of patents and ﬁrms (Shapiro (2001)). Ziedonis (2004) ﬁnds that frag-
mented property rights (i.e. when ownership rights for related, sequential innovations
are spread across multiple owners) incentivize ﬁrms to acquire patents aggressively
in order to pre-empt holdup or litigation in the future.
On the selling side of the technology market, a particularly valuable source of
external innovation for ﬁrms is inventors or small, technologically proﬁcient com-
panies such as start-ups (Gans, Stern (2003)). Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella
(2001) and Gans, Stern (2003) note that effcient markets for innovation allows smaller
ﬁrms to specialize in innovation and development because access to such markets
gives small innovators the ability to earn returns without investing in commercializa-
tion methods. But small innovators face unique challenges when selling their ideas.
A major dilemma is the paradox of disclosure (Arrow (1962), Anton and Yao (1994)).
While small innovators must typically disclose their ideas in order to credibly signal
the value of their invention, this also renders them liable to expropriation by the very
same potential buyers. Scholars have suggested several theoretical mechanisms by
which these small innovators may capture value from their inventions despite this
paradox. Anton and Yao (1994) suggest that innovators may earn compensation by
threatening diffusion of the invention to competitors, by only partially disclosing their
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invention (Anton and Yao (2002)), or by patenting (as opposed to relying on trade se-
crets) "small", less valuable innovations (Anton and Yao (2004)), although Serrano
(2010) ﬁnds that more valuable patents with higher citation counts are more likely
to be traded. Teece (1986) suggests that in weak approriability regimes, innovators
should invest in complementary assets.
An expanding area of literature explores the type of buyers who innovators
should approach. Depending on the characteristics of the buyer, innovators may run
higher risks of expropriation or earn substantially greater rents. Ahn and Yao (2015)
suggests that innovators should choose ﬁrms with lower commercialization capabil-
ities, i.e. the ability to realize the value of a given IP (whether through defensive,
proprietary, or licensing capacities), when IP regimes weaken. However, this stream
remains primarily theoretical.
Our contribution lies in empirically exploring the question of how small inno-
vators respond to weak property rights regimes by comparing their choice of buyers
across different appropriability environments. By examining in‡uence upon buyer
choice, our results may suggest prescriptive advice for innovators on how to select
the potential buyer and provide context for ﬁrms in their patent acquisition activi-
ties. Given the predictions of Ahn and Yao (2015), we examine buyer choice as it is
determined by a ﬁrm’s commercialization and defensive capability.
We exploit a relatively novel dataset on patent transfers, based on USPTO
recording of patent reassignments, which are required whenever transfers occur (oth-
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erwise the transfer may not be binding). The empirical literature on small innovator
behavior has mainly focused upon licensing agreements aside from from Serrano
(2005, 2010), for instance ﬁnding that successful startups in biotechnology industry
have generally entered licensing agreements or alliances (Stern (1995), Lerner and
Merges (1998)). However, patent transfers have unique properties. While licensing
grants access to the underlying technology, usually at the cost of some royalties, it
does not grant ownership privileges unless otherwise speciﬁed. This includes using
patents to prevent imitation, rent-seeking through sub-licenses, settlement decisions,
etc. Further, the licensee bears the risk that the licensor may terminate the contract
and holdup the licensee’s rents, or that the licensor may license the same technol-
ogy to competitors. Galasso, Schankerman, and Serrano (2013) show that transfer
of patents reduce the likelihood of litigation on average. Patent transfers, therefore,
potentially captures the movement of particularly valuable IP.
The Patent Legal Environment
As patents are legal instruments, patent court rulings play a powerful role
in the strength of the patent regime in our dataset. Since the 1980s, the United States
has undergone substantial shifts in its patent environment. Prior to the establishment
of the CAFC, district courts had managed the majority of patent infringement rul-
ings, encouraging a certain amount of "forum shopping" where litigators approached
courts known to be more supportive of patentees or infringers, depending on need
(Jaffe (2000), Gallini (2002)). The CAFC consolidated patent activity into a new
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federal appeals court, introducing a centralized environment for patent litigation on
appeals before the involvement of the Supreme Court. It is generally understood that
the CAFC was pro-patent, i.e. that it typically ruled in favor of patentees instead of
infringers. (Allison and Lemley (1998), Jaffe (2000), and Gallini (2002)). The CAFC
upheld the validity of patents at a higher rate than prior to its establishment. Further,
as the CAFC represented a new specialized court in the appeals process, providing
jurisdiction over patent-speciﬁc federal cases before the involvement of the Supreme
Court, the CAFC had a particularly strong inﬂuence on the legal landscape of patents.
But in the mid-1990s the patent environment once again began to shift as the
Supreme Court began to issue rulings that sharply curtailed the scope of upheld
patents (Lunney (2004)). Rulings reducing the scope of patents made it easier for
infringers to defend themselves in court, as they could argue they did not cover more
limited claims of a given patent. Markman v. Westview Instruments represents a wa-
tershed moment in patent law where patents were signiﬁcantly challenged in scope.
Herbert Markman, an inventor, brought an infringement suit against Westview In-
struments, Inc., claiming that the latter expropriated his invention of an inventory
system for dry cleaning. Over the process of appeals, the case evolved into a de-
bate regarding the jurisidiction of patent claim construction, i.e. the scope and exact
claims which a patent could protect. Finally, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that it was the jurisdiction of the judge and the court (and ultimately the
appellate and federal courts), not the jury, to determine the claim construction for
45
patents.1
2
During a discussion with the author on pivotal patent rulings in the past
twenty years, a practicing attorney in intellectual property law noted that Markman
v. Westview Instruments was "probably the most important patent law case in the last
few decades...resulting in ’Markman hearings’in every patent case since then, essen-
tially miniature trials before the judge to determine what exactly the patent language
means." In the legal community, Markman hearings are often described as the most
signiﬁcant part of patent litigation, as claim construction is an essential aspect of
almost any patent case.1
3
From the perspective of appropriability regimes, Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments had a negative impact on the strength of property rights. This is due to a variety
of factors. The primary cause was the signiﬁcant increase in the cost of litigating in-
fringers, which derived from the new requirement of Markman hearings. Professor
Edmund Sease of Drake University Law School (a practicing attorney and partner at
his law ﬁrm) writes (Sease 2004):
"Patent litigation has become notoriously expensive... Garden-variety
patent case incur[s] attorneys’ fees of at least one million dollars.
A case of any substance or size normally has larger fees, typically
within the range of one to two million dollars. These ever escalating
costs are... a result of requiring a separate Markman hearing (ital-
ics added for emphasis) ... [Patentees] must prevail twice [due to
Markman hearings] before they ever have a chance for a judgment!"
In addition, Markman v. Westview reduced the likelihood of plaintiff (paten-
tee) victory in trial. It is well-documented that juries are pro-patent, more so than
judges, possibly due to the fact that juries are enamored of the inventor’s journey
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narrative (Moore (2000)). Consequently, the shift of the power of patent rulings
post-Markman towards the court and judges had a signiﬁcantly negative impact upon
the rate of rulings in favor of patentees. In her study on judge vs. jury rulings on
patent infringement cases, Moore (2000) explores a dataset of patent rulings from
the Administrative Ofﬁce of the United States Courts from 1983 to 1999, and ﬁnds
that juries rule in favor of the patentee 68 percent of the time, as opposed to the
judge’s 51 percent, corroborating Allison and Lemley (1998). Jaffe (2000) ﬁnds that
in 1990, district court rulings on patent validity and infringement were upheld on
appeal 90% of the time (rising from 62% in 1980; patent invalidity claims were over-
turned 28% of the time in 1990, rising from 12% in 1980. Altogether, litigated patent
validity had risen to 54% by 1990). On the other hand, Moore (2005) ﬁnds that post-
Markman, the central appeals court CAFC ruled in favor of the infringer 58 percent
of the time. Altogether, the statistics suggest that after Markman patent holders faced
an IP regime with a substantially higher risk of facing infringement and appropriation
without legal protection.
Given the signiﬁcance and effect of the Markman v. Westview ruling, we exam-
ine how patent buyer choice (based on commercialization and defensive capabilities)
for innovators changed from before to after the ruling. The results may give insight
as to how innovators respond to legal shifts in property rights environments.
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2.3 Data Review
We use the most recent version of the dataset of patent ﬁlings and citations drawn
from the NBER patent database assembled by Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson
from the USPTO, described in Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (2001) but updated
through 2006. We examine transfers from individuals, non-corporate entities ex-
cluding universities and government, and undeffned entities (according to the HJT
entity classiffcation category) to U.S. corporations. The data consists of 13,619
patent transfers from individuals and small ﬁrms to U.S. corporations from 1992 to
2000 of patents classiﬁed as HJT technological category 2, consisting of communica-
tions, computer hardware & software, computer peripherals, and information storage
patents. We examine a single general industry to limit the variations that arise from
different business practices across different industry classiﬁcations (and accordant
industries). This set corresponds to 94 technological categories in the International
Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC) system. Individuals were determined by the entity classi-
ﬁcation performed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), which separated assignees
as U.S. and non-U.S. nongovernmental organizations, U.S. or foreign individuals,
U.S. or foreign governments, or U.S. non-Federal government agency. In the period
before Markman v. Westview, the traded patents spanned 62 industries, while in the
period after Markman v. Westview the patents spanned 85 industries. 53 industries
were common across both periods. Small ﬁrms were determined as those that were
issued less than ﬁve total patents in a given year, paralleling Serrano (2005).
4
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To the extent possible, we removed all acquirers that are non-practicing entities
(NPEs) or "trolls", i.e. entities that acquire patents with no intent of commercializing
patents but rather solely to litigate and extract licensing fees from other ﬁrms. As
NPEs are not involved in the value chain (aside from potentially providing liquidity
and matching services for technology), acquisitions by NPEs are not associated with
the strategic aspects of innovation markets as described above, and may potentially
confuse results. We remove NPEs from our transfer data by matching entity names
with a list of known NPEs, provided by www.patentfreedom.com, which lists over
830 NPEs as of July 2014.
Employer-employee relationships were also controlled for by examining the
date of transfer and the date of grant. If the transfer of the patent occured within 3
months of the patent’s grant, it was deemed to be an employer-employee relationship.
Further, if an inventor sells multiple times to the same ﬁrm, this suggests to a certain
extent that a relationship has developed between the buyer and the seller. As this
could inﬂuence the dynamics of the patent sale decision, we removed all repeat sales
from the dataset as well. While this loses some of the dynamics of sellers changing
their buyers due to varying offers, as discussed this introduces potential complexities
into the bargaining dynamics that may affect the analysis.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on those ﬁrms that purchase patents
from innovators.
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Variable name Mean SD Median Min Max
Pre-Markman: 6,785 Traded Patents
Fwd Cites 21.4 25.7 14 0 526
Age 2.59 1.10 3 0 11
Post-Markman:6,834 Traded Patents
Fwd Cites 16.9 21.6 10 0 329
Age 2.19 1.26 2 0 15
Total Set: 13,619 Traded Patents
Fwd Cites 19.4 23.8 12 0 526
Age 2.39 1.20 2 0 15
As discussed in the motivation, we wish to study how patent buyer choice is
in‡uenced by varying appropriability regimes. In particular, we wish to examine
buyer commercialization and defensive capabilities, as suggested by Ahn and Yao
(2015). To capture this commercialization and defensive capability for ﬁrms, we
use a measure of patent holdings. More speciﬁcally, we proxy commercialization
and defensive capability by using total patent holdings held by a ﬁrm in the same
technological classiﬁcation as the patent being traded, normalized by the median of
the ﬁrms with an active presence in that technological category. A large and diverse
patent portfolio signals the ﬁrm’s ability to commercialize a wide array of technology,
or prevent other ﬁrms from doing the same, and to potentially defend itself through
counter-litigation. Further, as patents can be costly to acquire and maintain, they can
signal other information about the ﬁrm’s capabilities. Patent counts thus serve as a
credible signal of ﬁrm quality and value (Parchomovsky and Wagner (2005)). We
normalize this measure by dividing the patent count with the median of the holdings
of the active ﬁrms within the technological classiﬁcation. This controls for industries
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with high patent counts in general, and captures the relative strength and capabili-
ties of a ﬁrm within a given technological area.
5
It is important to note, however,
that patent classiﬁcations distinguish on a technological level but not necessarily on
an industrial one - ﬁrms holding patents in the same category are more likely to in-
dicate use of such technology over pure competition in the same area, as a measure
such as SIC code would indicate. However, from the perspective of a patent seller,
the potential buyers’ differences in competing in different but related industries (for
example, at different stages in the workstream) are not as strictly relevant as the size
of the buyer and the extent to which they use the given technology. In other words,
the commercial capabilities of the buyer can be considered separate from direct com-
petition, and is relevant to the buyer as long as they use similar technologies and are
thus potential buyers for the seller’s patent.
Among those ﬁrms that acquire patents from individual innovators, the average
number of trade acquisitions per ﬁrm per year is 9.83, with a standard deviation of
40.61. The average number of acquisitions by a given ﬁrm over its lifetime is 20.47
trades, with a standard deviation of 148.95. We collect information on ﬁrm operating
activity, including R&D spending, revenue, employee count, etc. However, this data
is only available for public ﬁrms. Of the 415 buyers, 282 of them are private, but
public buyers are responsible for 11,385 transfers (83.6 percent). This implies that the
vast majority of transfers are conducted by public ﬁrms. Further, public ﬁrms have
much higher average holdings, as indicated in Table 2; the average total holdings (per
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technological classiﬁcation of trade) is 370, as opposed to 6 for private ﬁrms. This
may reﬂect the higher general size and revenue of public ﬁrms as opposed to private
ones, and thus their higher holding counts.
To provide a baseline for comparison for the actual patent buyers to potential
other buyers that the innovator may choose, we organize the data to provide informa-
tion on potential alternative buyers for the traded patents. We select these alternative
buyers as those ﬁrms that ﬁled or purchased at least two patents (as the list of ﬁrms
that acquire only one patent is very high, and not necessarily indicative of signiﬁcant
activity) in the same primary IPC classiﬁcation of the traded patent within a two-year
window of the trade. This indicates that the ﬁrm has an active presence in the same
technological area during that time.
6
To distinguish between potential buyers and ac-
tual buyers in the data, we generate a categorical variable that records 1 if a trade for
a patent occurs to a speciﬁc buyer in the year of trade and 0 otherwise. This is used
as the estimate for the dependent variable in the estimation.
Table 2 lists some summary statistics on potential patent buyers, prior to Mark-
man v. Westview Instruments.
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Prior to the Markman ruling, there are on average 151 potential (or "alter-
native") buyers per transferred patent, with a range from 11 to 202 possible buyers
(including the actual buyer). There are a total of 394 unique potential buyers prior
to Markman. R&D Intensity is actually slightly lower for actual buyers than it is
for potential buyers, although in absolute terms both revenue and R&D spending
are approximately half what they are for actual buyers. Actual buyers tend to be
slightly larger in size compared to the average potential buyer in terms of employee
count (109.3 over 76.7). Actual buyers, on average, have signiﬁcantly higher average
patent holdings (per technological category of traded ﬁrms) than do potential buyers,
at least among public ﬁrms, although this is driven in part by a high number of ﬁrms
that have holdings of only two patents within the technological category.
After the Markman ruling, there are on average 216 potential (or "alter-
native") buyers per transferred patent, with a range from 4 to 453 possible buyers
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(including the actual buyer). There are a total of 865 unique potential buyers prior to
Markman. The annual revenue, R&D, employee count, and capital and R&D inten-
sity ﬁgures seem largely comparable across periods, although the average holdings
count is slightly higher for the post-Markman period for public companies. Again,
we see that private potential buyers have much lower patent holdings than public
ﬁrms.
Of the 394 unique potential buyers that appeared before the Markman v. West-
view rulings, 264 (67%) reappear after the Markman ruling across the same industry,
indicating a degree of homogeneity in the market of potential buyers faced by patent
sellers. In other words, approximately two-thirds of the buyers available to sellers
prior to Markman are still present after Markman. We also examine some charac-
teristics of the patents themselves. Table 4 below summarizes the lifetime forward
citation counts and the age of traded patents before and after Markman v. Westview.
Variable name Mean SD Median Min Max
Pre-Markman: 6,785 Traded Patents
Fwd Cites 21.4 25.7 14 0 526
Age 2.59 1.10 3 0 11
Post-Markman:6,834 Traded Patents
Fwd Cites 16.9 21.6 10 0 329
Age 2.19 1.26 2 0 15
Total Set: 13,619 Traded Patents
Fwd Cites 19.4 23.8 12 0 526
Age 2.39 1.20 2 0 15
The average number of citations per traded patent in its lifetime is 19.4 cita-
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tions, with a standard deviation of 23.8. As citations may indicate higher value (Hall,
Jaffe, Trajtenberg (2005)), this suggests that most traded patents are at least some-
what valuable, corroborating Serrano (2010); only 2.33 percent of traded patents in
the dataset generate no citations in their lifetime. This indicates that reassignment
occurs when patents are particularly valuable. As would be expected considering we
are examining transfers from individuals to ﬁrms, the vast majority of reassignments
in the datasets are ﬁrst-time transfers in the patent’s life, suggesting that buyers are
able to identify value relatively early in the lifecycle of a patent. This corroborates
intuitively with the notion that the value of traded patents is understood by industrial
buyers and potentially competed over.
There are 415 unique buyers for the 13,619 transfers. Most buyers are therefore
repeat buyers. As discussed earlier, repeated sales between the same buyer and seller
has been removed. However, with the dominance of particular buyers in the market-
place, this raises the notion that certain ﬁrms can develop reputations in the market,
which could incentivize certain sellers to sell their patents to ﬁrms with greater rep-
utations. However, with the usage of ﬁxed-effects, such ﬁrm-speciﬁc year-speciﬁc
effects can be mitigated or otherwise controlled for.
2.4 Methodology
We divide the dataset into two periods: before the Markman v. Westview ruling in
1996, and after. The two time periods are thus 1992-1996, and 1996- 2000. The
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periods are divided directly before and after by the date the ruling was decided: April
23,1996.
7
We apply a ﬁxed-effect logistic (logit) model for panel data (Greene (2010))
on both periods. The logit captures the effect of various potential-buyer-speciﬁc in-
dependent variables upon discrete choice - in this case, the effect of ﬁrm commer-
cialization and defensive capabilities affects buyer choice for inventors. However, it
is important to note that this method measures a before-after effect as opposed to a
differences-in-differences effect. The equation is as follows:
Pr(Yt,K,i = 1|Xt.K,i) = exp(αP,t,K + βPXt,K,i)
1 + exp(αP,t,K + βPXt,K,i)
+ εt,K
WhereK indicates the patent being traded in year t, and i represents the counter
for the potential and actual buyers for the traded patent in the year of trade (as such,
the t really applies to the i indicator). The data is organized in the following way.
Each patent-year pair where a trade occurs (i.e. the year for which a speciﬁc patent
is traded) is treated as a single observation. Yt,K is the categorical dependent variable
measuring whether a trade has occurred or not. Yt,K is recorded as 1 when a trade
occurs to a potential (or actual) buyer, and 0 otherwise. P is 1 for the period before
Markman v. Westview, and 2 for the period after Markman. The regressions will be
run separately for P = 1, 2, and the coefﬁcient vectors β1,2 tested for statistically
signiﬁcance differences.
αP,t,K are measures of conditional ﬁxed-effects arising from within-sample
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variations - in other words, variations that arise from factors speciﬁc to the year and
potential buyers. Including this factor controls for potential trends or biases such as
industry changes, patent purchasing trends, or ﬁrm reputation.
Xt,K,i represents the explanatory variables, which include the following vari-
ables:
The primary variable of interest is the normalized patent holdings measure per
potential buyer. This is measured as the potential buyer’s cumulative patent count
(not including expired patents or patents sold) in the patent’s speciﬁc industry, di-
vided by the median patent holdings (of patents classifﬁed in that industry) of all
active ﬁrms with a presence in the industry. As the component of the vector βP
relating to normalized patent holdings (which we will term β1,P for convenience) in-
creases, this indicates that the probability that a trade occurs with a buyer with higher
normalized patent holdings increases. In other words, inventors choose to sell their
patents to the potential buyer with higher normalized patent holdings.
Below we list other variables we include in the regression to control for various
endogeneity issues and bias.
• R&D intensity, measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of annual R&D
spending to employee count. If R&D intensity is high, this may reﬂect a ﬁrm
investing heavily in R&D. This controls for a source of omitted variable bias,
as high R&D spending may cause higher rate of patent purchases from the
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ﬁrm, and potentially incentivizing inventors to sell to the ﬁrm due to more
attractive bargaining or available capital.
• Capital intensity, measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of net PP&E
to employee count. Capital intensity may indicate to what extent the ﬁrm may
be at risk of hold-up (i.e. where a ﬁrm may be unable to execute a project
and realize returns because of blockages by another entity, which may be
demanding rents. Patents represent a prime opportunity for hold-up as the
holder of the patent can legally block another ﬁrm from capitalizing on a
technology that infringes upon the patent). If capital intensity is high, then
the potential downside of being held up is high, incentivizing ﬁrms to acquire
patents aggressively, as suggested by Ziedonis (2004).
• Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of employee count. This measure
is included to control for omitted variable bias where a larger ﬁrm would have
access to higher number of potential avenues to encounter any given patent
(i.e. lowering search costs). Size also proxies for ﬁrm reputation to a certain
extent, which would also lower search costs on the side of the ﬁrm. The ease
of ﬁnding patents to acquire may bias inventors to sell to larger ﬁrms as they
have found those potential buyers more quickly and easily.
After we run the logit on both periods, we apply the seemingly unrelated re-
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gression estimation (SURE) method (Zeller (1962)) to test whether the difference in
the normalized holdings coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant across time-period subsamples.
2.5 Results and Robustness Checks
Table 5 summarizes our regression results. The base regression, shows hold-
ings to have a positive and signiﬁcant impact upon buyer choice both prior and post
Markman v. Westview. But the degree of holdings had a stronger impact on the prob-
ability of the transfer occuring before the ruling than afterwards, while the SURE
test demonstrates that the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different. The interpretation
of the baseline result in the ﬁrst and second columns can be interpreted as follows:
before Markman v. Westview, a patent holder would be more approximately 2 times
(2 = e0.701) as likely to sell the patent to a potential buyer with one unit more of nor-
malized patent holdings, and 1.5 times (1.5 = e0.421) as likely after the ruling. These
values are statistically signiﬁcant, as well as signiﬁcantly different. An exact inter-
pretation of these statistics is higher patent holdings has a positive impact in both
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cases, but that it has a lesser impact after Markman v. Westview. This can only occur
if the frequency of sales to ﬁrms with lower normalized patent holdings, on average,
in the distribution of potential buyers. In other words, innovators were more likely to
sell their patents to ﬁrms with lower patent holdings after the ruling took effect.
We run several different speciﬁcations to check for robustness, including intro-
ducing various controls. Due to the speciﬁcations of the ﬁxed-effect logit, time-based
trends, such as a general shift away from patent acquisition among larger ﬁrms, are
unlikely, and time-invariant ﬁrm effects, such as brand or the presence of certain
long-term personnel, are also controlled. Generally, we ﬁnd that R&D intensity has
a signiﬁcant and positive impact upon the probability of sale, which corroborates
the intuition that ﬁrms that have higher R&D intensity would acquire patents more
aggressively, acquiring external technology as part of their R&D efforts. Capital in-
tensity is also positive and signiﬁcant, corroborating Ziedonis (2004), who found that
ﬁrms that have higher liabilities from hold-up (i.e. larger capital intensities) would
be more likely to also acquire patents aggressively. In the regression speciﬁcations
including both R&D intensity and capital intensity, both Capital and R&D intensities
have relatively large effects. Employee count is also positive and signiﬁcant, match-
ing the intuition that larger ﬁrms would have a higher probability of ﬁnding patents
to acquire due to its network and manpower, as well as having higher reputational ef-
fects. As the control variables are introduced, the effect of holdings decreases, which
suggests that they play a signiﬁcant role in buyer choice for innovators. However, the
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estimated coefﬁcient upon the normalized holdings variables is positive, signiﬁcant,
and decreases for all speciﬁcations of the regression after Markman v. Westview
including all control variables.
We also estimated the regression using a two-year time window before and
after Markman. We also considered different normalization methods for the patent
holdings variable. We respectively divide the technological category patent holdings
count by the mean and the sum of the top ten holdings in the industrial classiﬁcation
(ﬁrm), to test whether the difference in the normalized holdings coefﬁcient remains
signiﬁcant and decreasing across time-period subsamples. The estimation is shown
below in Table 6. We again ﬁnd that the results are robust across different time frames
and normalization factors.
Finally, we also tested a speciﬁcation where alternative buyers were chosen as
those ﬁrms that purchased two or more patents in the technological category of the
traded patents, instead of those that purchased or ﬁlled two patents. In all speci-
ﬁcations, again the estimated coefﬁcient upon the normalized holdings variables is
positive, signiﬁcant, and decreases for all speciﬁcations of the regression after Mark-
man v. Westview.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics on Traded Patents
Variable name Mean SD Median Min Max
Pre-Markman: 6,785 Traded Patents
Fwd Cites 21.4 25.7 14 0 526
Age 2.59 1.10 3 0 11
Post-Markman:6,834 Traded Patents
Fwd Cites 16.9 21.6 10 0 329
Age 2.19 1.26 2 0 15
Total Set: 13,619 Traded Patents
Fwd Cites 19.4 23.8 12 0 526
Age 2.39 1.20 2 0 15
2.6 Discussion
Literature suggests that ﬁrms with greater technological capabilities derive greater
beneﬁts from external technology, demonstrated empirically by Veuglers and Cassi-
man (2002). While this supports the positive and signiﬁcant effect upon holdings,
the decreasing effect of the coefﬁcient after Markman v. Westview may be somewhat
counterintuitive for several reasons. For example, in weak property rights regimes,
one may expect that ﬁrms with larger patent holdings derive greater value from a
given patent, as the combined patent portfolio would render more effective defense
for the underlying technology (Parchomovsky and Wagner (2005)). This may incen-
tivize ﬁrms with larger holdings to extend larger offers to inventors. Further, weak-
ening patent regimes may incentivize ﬁrms with valuable technologies to acquire
patents aggressively to try and bolster their existing defenses, in a manner similar to
that suggested by Ziedonis (2004) - ﬁrms with higher commercialization capabilities
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and resources may ﬁnd themselves more concerned about potential expropriation yet
also able to expend greater resources in patent acquisition. However, we ﬁnd that in-
ventors consistently trade their patents to ﬁrms with smaller relative patent holdings
when the patent regime weakens, even controlling for time, industry, or ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects, suggesting other factors may be at work.
We consider some possible explanations. As discussed earlier, the methodol-
ogy does not represent a full DID framework measuring the impact against a hy-
pothetical "control group" scenario; rather the methodology measures changes in a
before-and-after fashion. Accordingly, the results may be driven by external fac-
tors independent of those measured above - in other words, changes across time may
potentially be driving the effect measured in the results. We discuss potential expla-
nations, as well as potential methods of dealing with external factors changing over
time.
One possible explanation, as described above, is provided by Ahn and Yao
(2015). Economic theory suggests that in strong property rights environments, in-
ventors will be able to appropriate a substantial portion of the value of an IP without
fear of expropriation. Consequently, inventors would be incentivized to approach
ﬁrms with a stronger market position (as proxied by patent holdings, which also de-
fends the existing rents better). Ahn and Yao argues that in weak property rights
environments, there is a risk of expropriation - however, inventors are able to appro-
priate some amount of value by threatening to defect to a competitor if expropriation
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occurs. According to the bargaining dynamics, inventors would be incentivized to
approach ﬁrms with weaker market position, because they would be able to capture
a higher level of value.
However, while the theory assumes only two potential buyers of intellectual
property in the market in different property rights scenarios, this is not necessarily
an accurate reﬂection of reality, as seen in the empirical discussion above. On the
other hand, introducing higher numbers of buyers will not necessarily alter the re-
sults or reasoning. In the complete property rights case, the inventor can still employ
an open bargaining framework and sell his invention to the ﬁrm that can afford to
outbid all other competitors - which would be the "leader" as characterized by its
ability to commercialize intellectual property rights. In the no-property rights sce-
nario, the inventor will threaten diffusion across multiple potential buyers to bargain
with the potential buyer. To maximize returns, the inventor would approach a ﬁrm
that would pay greater amounts to prevent deviation. This would not be the leading
ﬁrm - the leading ﬁrm would pay the highest amount to encourage deviation, so rival
ﬁrms would be forced to pay greater amounts to prevent this - the bargaining dynam-
ics are thus not signiﬁcantly different whether two potential buyers exist, or higher
numbers (although the rival ﬁrms paying for deviation would be required to have the
capabilities to outbid the leading ﬁrm’s offer). In such no-property rights scenarios,
the seller would approach not the largest, but the "second-best," or at least an alter-
native buyer that is large enough to offer higher compensation. Lower numbers of
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buyers is also not necessarily highly unrealistic from the inventor’s perspective, as
search and exposure costs for inventors looking to their commercialization invention
can be signiﬁcant, causing inventors to be aware of only a small number of potential
buyers.
This is a potentially signiﬁcant discussion as, as seen above, actual buyers gen-
erally have signiﬁcantly higher patent holdings than do potential buyers, both pre and
post-Markman. This raises the concern that potential alternative buyers as described
above may not be relevant from the perspective of the inventors. Post-Markman does
have a higher number of alternative buyers per patent with lower average patent hold-
ings (although this not signiﬁcantly so - 5.6 to 6.0 for post to pre-Markman). From
the perspective of the empirical methodology, however, this may not be an issue -
if a higher number of potential alternative buyers with lower patent holdings are in-
cluded, this should - on average - bias the results upwards as actual buyers have
higher patent holdings, meaning a plethora of low-holdings alternative buyers would
make the impact of higher patent holdings more signiﬁcant. Thus, this effect provides
some indirect support for the theory.
Another potential explanation is that as industries mature, ﬁrms specialize their
industrial and technological focus, resulting in inventors selling to ﬁrm with fewer
patent holdings as smaller, specialized ﬁrms are the ones equipped to understand the
particular technologies protected by a patent. However, this is not fully consistent
with the results. The specialization effect may be controlled by using the median or
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mean normalizer for the patent holdings. The logic is as follows: as industries spe-
cialize, average (or median) ﬁrm holdings would fall, counteracting the decrease in
the holdings measure for the actual buyer. As the pattern of innovator sales choice re-
mains consistent across the median and mean normalizations, the results suggest that
specialization over time is not driving the pattern. The different normalization tech-
niques would also control for changing deﬁnitions of technological classiﬁcations in
the dataset.
The results may also be driven by ﬁrm acquisition strategies. In weaker prop-
erty rights regimes, ﬁrms may place greater reliance upon trade secrets, as suggested
by Anton and Yao (2005). Traded patents may therefore be less valuable, on average,
and be traded to smaller ﬁrms that may require such technology, while larger ﬁrms
could innovate internally or have less requirements for less valuable technology. This
is somewhat supported by the average citations on the patents traded before and af-
ter Markman v. Westview, decreasing from 21.4 citations to 16.9. As citations are
a proxy for patent value (Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg (2005)), this suggests that traded
patents are indeed less valuable, on average. However, 16.9 citations is still higher
than the average citation for ﬁled patents in the industry in the timeframe, which is
2.34. Thus, traded patents are still more valuable than the average patent.
Finally, as discussed above the analysis focuses upon patent transfers as op-
posed to licensing agreements, which are more common. While this was partially
due to availability of data, transfers are also a representative sample, to a certain ex-
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tent. Licensing agreements often have transfer stipulations at the end of their term.
Nevertheless, it is possible that after Markman v. Westview Instruments, licensing
agreements were conducted for the majority of patents while a specialized subset
were transferred - potentially less valuable ones the current owners were willing to
relinquish. However, as the transfers are from small inventors with a diminished
capacity to self-innovate, and as the data has suggested that transferred patents are
valuable, this scenario seems intuitively unlikely.
2.7 Conclusion
This essay explores the impact of weakening intellectual property regimes upon the
market for patents. By examining the impact upon patent buyer choice before and
after the 1996 Supreme Court ruling on Markman v. Westview, we ﬁnd that inno-
vators generally choose to sell to ﬁrms with lower patent holdings after the ruling,
which weakened defense against infringement. This suggests that innovators sell to
ﬁrms with lower commercialization and patent defensive capabilities when the patent
regime weakens. Ahn and Yao (2015) may provide a possible explanation for this
pattern. This argues that bargaining dynamics for IP sales change across different
intellectual property regimes, and that in weaker IP regimes innovators may be in-
centivized to sell to ﬁrms with lower commercialization potential because they may
be able to capture higher levels of value.
The results provide several implications for innovators, ﬁrms, and policy-makers.
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For innovators, the result suggests that it may be optimal to sell to ﬁrms with lower
commercialization and defensive capabilities in weaker IP appropriability regimes.
For ﬁrms, the result could provide context for higher transactions costs associated
with acquiring external technology, and thus suggests that ﬁrms should invest more
in internal R&D in weaker patent regimes. Policy-makers may use these insights
to manage the implications of IP regimes depending on goals for IP diffusion and
efﬁcient IP markets.
There are several directions this research may be extended. First, this study
focuses upon patent sales. However, a substantial portion of patent value is trans-
ferred via licensing, so it may be illuminating to include licensing transactions and
see whether they conform to the same pattern before and after Markman v. Westview
or other shifts in IP regimes. Second, it is difﬁcult to directly test the mechanism un-
derlying Ahn and Yao (2015), as it depends on the value that innovators can capture.
If future research can gain access to the price or rents that innovators earn on their
IP, this could render further insight upon IP trading dynamics and observe the direct
impact of IP regimes on the market for innovation.
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Chapter 3
How Do I Use This? A Conceptual Model of
PatentDynamicCapabilities
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, patents - government-granted contracts providing exclusive
rights to any rents arising from a novel, non-obvious innovation - have become a crit-
ical component in competitive strategy (Chesbrough (2003), Fosfuri (2006)). They
are a signiﬁcant source of potential value or outlay – signiﬁcant patent portfolios
such as those auctioned by Eastman Kodak and Motorola are regularly valued in the
billions, and the ruling of infringement in a patent lawsuit can result in the required
payments of equal magnitude.
Firms have thus developed multiple ways of organizing their resources, assets,
and behavior in a way to maximize the value of their portfolios (Somaya (2012)).
However, patents are complex instruments, and as ﬁrm strategic goals and circum-
stances change, existing conﬁgurations of patent holdings can become less optimal
over time. Consequently, ﬁrm patent strategy should incorporate some dynamic ca-
pabilities, allowing the ﬁrm to update its patent portfolio, as well as the strategic
processes and supporting assets of those portfolios, to adapt to its strategic environ-
ment.
The purpose of this essay is to introduce a conceptual framework for under-
standing the processes driving dynamic ﬁrm behavior around patents by introducing
granular insights from the patents literature to the concept of dynamic capabilities,
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i.e. "the ﬁrm’s ability to integrate, build, or reconﬁgure internal and external com-
petencies to address rapidly changing environments" (Teece et al. (1997)). We also
apply the model within the speciﬁc framework of the technology life-cycle model
to highlight the conceptual model’s potential value in both generating insight into
existing patent strategy as well as providing prescriptive tactics to practitioners.
The essay comes at the union of two major streams of literature: dynamic capa-
bilities as a source of competitive advantage, a highly inﬂuential stream of thought in
strategic management theory (1997); and patent management strategy, which encom-
passes a broad range of literature ranging from optimal patent acquisition patterns in
industries with fragmented technology to strategic disclosure in weak property rights
regimes (Ziedonis (2004); Anton and Yao (2002)). While previous literature have re-
alized the signiﬁcant non-market strategic value of patents, including characterizing
them as a type of resource (Barney (1984)), as well as the inherent signiﬁcance of
dynamic capabilities in pursuing innovation as a cornerstone of competitive advan-
tage (Teece et al. (1997), Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), Zollo and Winter (2002)),
the contribution of this essay is to identify speciﬁc dynamic capabilities as related to
patents, even extending beyond competition purely via innovative technology.
The structure of this essay is as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the three
primary avenues by which patents provide value to ﬁrms and how optimal patent
value can change depending on the patent legal and market environment and ﬁrm
strategic goals. We base this section generally upon Soyama (2012). In Section 3,
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we develop a conceptual model of the ﬁrm’s patent dynamic capabilities, composed
of 1) patent evaluation capabilities, 2) patent deployment capabilities, and 3) patent
acquisition capabilities, and explore how this allows ﬁrms to adaptively reconﬁgure
its patent strategy. Section 4 applies the conceptual model to the technology life-
cycle theory, developing hypotheses for optimal ﬁrm behavior in response to this
life-cycle. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Patent Value, Strategic Goals, Environmental Factors,
and Alignment
It is well-understood that patents are valuable in providing competitive advantage via
exclusive access to rents arising from innovative technologies. However, patents are
more than merely a static source of technological rights; instead, they are dynamic,
multi-faceted objects that render multiple types of value to the ﬁrm. This section
describes the three primary ways that patents provide value to ﬁrms: commercializa-
tion, defensive, and leveraging value.
3.2.1 Commercialization Value
Commercialization, i.e. using a patent to prevent competitor imitation of a valu-
able technology, has been described as the "most powerful beneﬁt" of patents (Riv-
ette and Kline (2000)). The commercialization value of a patent, i.e. the traditional
understanding of the patent as described above, derives from the ﬁrm’s use of the
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direct technological innovation underlying the patent (Somaya (2012)). The novel
technology allows the ﬁrm to both expand their existing technological capabilities or
to develop and commercialize new technologies while protecting against imitation
from competitors (Duysters and Hagedoorn (2000)). In other words, commercializa-
tion value is the competitive advantage that the ﬁrm gains in having exclusive access
to valuable technology (Kitch (1977), Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998)), which can be
measured directly in terms of income, or indirectly as beneﬁting the ﬁrm’s internal
processes and R&D.
3.2.2 Leveraging Value
Firms can also generate value by threatening or applying patent litigation against
other ﬁrms using technology overlapping with the patent’s claims. Since patents are
exclusionary devices, the patent-holder can "hold-up," or prevent outside ﬁrms from
proﬁting from products developed using the technology, particularly when commer-
cialization of a valuable technology is dependent upon the innovation covered by the
patent. At the least, the patent-holder can threaten costly litigation, which bears the
risk of court rulings in favor of the patent holder (instead of the commercializer).
In those cases, the outside ﬁrm would either be prevented from commercializing the
product altogether (losing all investments for little return), be required to pay licens-
ing fees, or be forced to substitute for the patent innovation. The high costs faced by
the outside ﬁrm thus provides signiﬁcant bargaining power to the patent-holder, who
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can use this bargaining power to extract value from the commercializing ﬁrms (Lem-
ley and Shapiro (2007)) in the form of licensing fees or other strategic concessions.8
For example, the threat of hold-up or litigation can be used to bargain for access
to the threatened ﬁrm’s technology, to provide counter-suits when the patent holder
has been threatened itself, or to generate other non-market strategic value (Arora and
Fosfuri (2003)). Naturally, leveraging value is only available for ﬁrms that have own
the patent, which raises the beneﬁt of acquiring over licensing the patent.9
Leveraging is thus most valuable when the patent claims cover a signiﬁcant
technology used by other ﬁrms, and the costs and risks inventing alternative tech-
nologies to avoid the patent-covered technology are sufﬁciently high. Bargaining
power for both parties in leveraging scenarios is ultimately decided by the threat-
ened ﬁrms’ expectations of the potential beneﬁts of ﬁghting the litigation, which can
be inﬂuenced by the leveraging ﬁrm. For example, a ﬁrm with an aggressive repu-
tation in patent settlements can signal to other ﬁrms that litigation may be a costly
option (Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis (2009), Waldfogel (1995)). The inﬂuence of
the ﬁrm’s assets upon patent leveraging value is discussed further in the section on
internal ﬁrm strategic characteristics below.
8 Non-practicing entities (NPEs), colloquially known as "patent trolls," base their strategy solely
upon extracting this licensing value from ﬁrms that are commercializing technologies that relate to
the patents held by the NPEs.
9 Occasionally, some licensing contracts allow the licensee the ability to enforce the patent and
litigate against outside infringers.
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3.2.3 Defensive Value
Leveraging and defensive value exist in counterpoint – whereas leveraging value
derives from the application of the exclusionary power of patents against other ﬁrms,
defensive value comes from protecting against leveraging strategies from outside
patent-holders, preventing hold-up or loss of rents via licensing. Fundamentally,
the need for defensive strategies arises because a patent confers only the right to ex-
clude others, not an afﬁrmative right to use the patented technology - as opposed
to commercialization value, which provides new opportunities for ﬁrms to develop
competitive advantages and technologies, patents provide defensive value when it
allows ﬁrms to use their own existing technology. Firms often make signiﬁcant,
non-recoverable, and non-redeployable investments to develop or commercialize a
technology before fully exploring how patent rights are committed, particularly in
fast-paced, capital-intensive industries. Such investments render ﬁrms especially vul-
nerable to hold-up, making defense against outside ﬁrms especially critical.
Defensive value can be distinguished from commercialization value because 1)
it can occur ex-post innovations, but more importantly 2) it is more of a countering
defensive measure against the patent holdings of other ﬁrms, rather than a staking of
essential commercialization technologies per se. That is, commercialization patents
capture new, valuable technologies, whereas defensive measures protect the value
chain from erosion from rent-seeking leveragers that can potentially hold-up the en-
tire production process.
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Consequently, the defensive value of patents is important in industries where
the risk of litigation or accidental infringement is high, whether due to industrial or
to market structure characteristics. For example, industries with fragmented patent
rights - in other words, when ownership of patents in an industry are split between
a high number of ﬁrms (Ziedonis (2004)) or when a large number of sequential or
complementary innovations are required to commercialize products (such as with
smartphones) the exposure to others’ patents could be particularly problematic (Hall
and Ziedonis (2001), Somaya and Teece (2001)). Such factors are discussed fur-
ther in the section on the ﬁrm’s strategic context, particularly external and market
structure characteristics.
Patent defensive value is realized by various tactics to prevent external litiga-
tion. For example, ﬁrms can either patent or obtain ex ante licenses to all required
inventions before commercializing (although this can sometimes be impractical due
to scope, timing, and breadth of market). Firms may also preempt risky patent rights
by disclosing inventions themselves (Guellec, Martinez, and Zunigac (2012)) or by
preventing patents from issuing through opposition and reexamination procedures
(Graham, Hall, and Harhoff (2003), Wagner (2009)).
3.2.4 Strategic Goals, Environmental Factors, and Alignment
Depending on the ﬁrm’s strategic goals and the legal and patent market environ-
ment, patent value can change dramatically.
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The value of a given patent is inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s strategic context, both in
terms of the ﬁrm’s strategic goals and the external environment in which it operates.
For instance, the ﬁrm can choose to use their competitive advantage in legal expertise
to enhance the leveraging value of patents, building their strategy around extracting
licensing revenue and concessions from rival ﬁrms. Other companies may instead
choose to apply an advantageous market position and technological expertise to gain
the maximum beneﬁt from the commercialization value of patents, deriving the full
value of patents.
The external patent environment refers to the dynamics of a given industry, in-
cluding the patent legal environment, which entails the legislation and market forces
that affect the ease of ﬁling and defense of patent claims from infringement, law-
suits, and re-evaluations; and the structure of the universe of patents (or at least on
an industrial level), i.e. the positioning of patent thickets and the co-dependencies of
innovations. For instance, smart phones are a product containing hundreds of innova-
tions, the patents to which are spread among multiple entities, thus requiring complex
contracts and leveraging deals to allow sales and production. Individual patents can
also be susceptible to reinterpretation or infringement due to "fuzziness" of tech-
nology deﬁnitions. On the other hand, pharmaceutical patents are known for their
relative simplicity, covering only single compounds, their derivatives, or drug deliv-
ery systems, and due to this simplicity are generally known to be easier to defend (at
least individually).
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We argue that there are, broadly speaking, four primary strategies that ﬁrms can
pursue with patents, corresponding to the patent value types. First is when a ﬁrm is
pursuing a policy of technological superiority – i.e. using knowledge of a proprietary
technology not known (or not accessible, due to patents) to competitors, allowing the
ﬁrm to gain a competitive advantage in the product marketplace. This can involve
both development of new competencies, or extension of older competencies into new
areas (Prahalad and Hamel (2000), Silverman (1999)). For this strategy, the commer-
cialization value of patents is particularly signiﬁcant, and due to the rapidly evolving
nature of such cutting-edge technologies, ﬁrms will be incentivized to pursue new
patents and stake out their “turf” in the chain of innovation.
When ﬁrms have already achieved a technological advantage they may shift
into a strategy of defending their existing competitive technologies – in this case,
ﬁrms will ﬁnd continuing value of their commercialization patents but also seek to
extend the defensive value of their existing patents. This strategic situation may arise
when property rights become stronger due to policy changes – as ﬁrms have less
incentive to pursue trade secrets over patenting, there may be a rush to patent impor-
tant extensions and applications of established technologies (as technologies that are
sufﬁciently aged are considered prior art) and preserve them in the marketplace.
Finally, ﬁrms may pursue of strategy of leveraging their existing patents against
outside ﬁrms, exactly in line with the patent’s leveraging value. It can pursue non-
market bargaining strategies, extracting strategic concessions in the marketplace, or
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simply derive high levels of licensing revenue. Such ﬁrms, as expected, rely exten-
sively upon patent leveraging value.
Legal Environment
As patents are inherently legal instruments, the legal environment has a
strong inﬂuence on their value. Depending on the legal regime, or the rules, laws,
regulations, and processes regarding patent ﬁling/registration, litigation, and defense,
the strength of patent rights can be affected in a variety of ways. Patents can suffer a
greater probability of being rejected outright in the application process; their claims
may be broadened or narrowed either during the application process, or after issuing
via re-evaluations and lawsuits. The distribution of patents across market players in
a given industry has a signiﬁcant impact on the value of individual patents.
When patent rights are weak, the paradox of disclosure becomes a particular is-
sue for entities that are attempting to sell their innovation, although they have various
method of preventing expropriation. Anton and Yao (1994) suggest that innovators
may earn compensation by threatening diffusion of the invention to competitors, by
only partially disclosing their invention (Anton and Yao (2002)), although Serrano
(2010) ﬁnds that more valuable patents with higher citation counts are more likely to
be traded. From the perspective of the buyer, this can reduce the value of the potential
value of the underlying technology of a patent to be acquired, while simultaneously
raising the cost of purchase. Combined with the weaker protection, industries with
weak patent rights may ﬁnd ﬁrms relying heavily instead on lead times, secrecy, and
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internal development capabilities, as seen in the semiconductor industry (Hall and
Ziedonis (2001)). A survey administered to 1478 R&D labs in the U.S. manufac-
turing sector in 1994 found that ﬁrms used both patenting and secrecy more heavily
when compared to the early 1980s, suggesting that ﬁrms rely on secrecy to protect
product innovations and use patents to "block" rival ﬁrms from accessing valuable
technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000)).
Since the 1980s, the United States has undergone substantial shifts in its patent
environment. Prior to the establishment of the US Court of Appeals Federal Cir-
cuit, or CAFC, district courts had managed the majority of patent infringement rul-
ings, encouraging a certain amount of "forum shopping" where litigators approached
courts known to be more supportive of patentees or infringers, depending on need
(Jaffe (2000), Gallini (2002)). The CAFC consolidated patent activity into a new
federal appeals court, introducing a centralized environment for patent litigation on
appeals before the involvement of the Supreme Court. It is generally understood that
the CAFC was pro-patent, i.e. that it typically ruled in favor of patentees instead
of infringers in infringement lawsuits (Allison and Lemley (1998), Jaffe (2000), and
Gallini (2002)). The CAFC upheld the validity of patents at a higher rate than prior
to its establishment, although it also did curtail the scope of patent claims somewhat.
On average, the CAFC represented a consolidated pro-patent regime especially com-
pared to the wide array of appeals courts to which patent holders or plaintiffs could
apply.
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The higher rate of rulings for patent holders as opposed to infringers means that
the commercialization value of patents rose due to the higher expected payoff due to
prevention of rent erosion through infringement. Rulings in favor of the patent holder
may also result in leveraging revenue. On the other hand, defensive value becomes of
greater importance for ﬁrms, as being litigated for infringement has a higher risk of
rulings in favor of the litigant. Acquisition of patents to prevent leveraging behavior
from other ﬁrms becomes of higher importance. Finally, as discussed above, greater
patent strength can, in conjunction with ﬁrm commercialization capabilities, may
have resulted in lower search costs.
As of the mid-1990s the tide of the patent environment began to shift once more
as the Supreme Court began to issue rulings that sharply curtailed the scope of upheld
patents (Lunney (2004)). Rulings reducing the scope of patents made it easier for
infringers to defend themselves in court, as they could argue they did not cover more
limited claims of a given patent. These rulings, although they did not necessarily
result in a higher rate of rulings for the patent holders, nevertheless reduced the scope
of patent protection and thus their commercialization value.
For practitioners, the analysis of the strength of property rights should take into
account industry-level effects. The effectiveness of patents depends not only on the
type of technology that is protected, but also on industry-speciﬁc regulation, as well
as the nature of the technology common to the industry. For example, the biotech-
nology and pharmaceuticals industry, for instance, is known to have more effective
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protection than the semiconductor industry, as the former industry’s products are
very difﬁcult to invent-around or imitate, being often based on individual molecules
or speciﬁc compounds (Benin (2005)). From a regulatory perspective, major court
cases such as the 1998 CAFC ruling State St. Bank v. Signature Financial Group pri-
marily affected software and algorithms, but also paved the way for patenting busi-
ness methods, which allowed for a new level of protection for previously undeﬁned
"technologies.".
Industrial Patent Structure
The structure of patents in a given industry has two primary components:
(1) the distribution and holdings of ﬁrms holding patents within an industry, and (2)
the innovative relationships between patents, i.e. the way patent innovations depend
on each other in order to be effective or commercially viable.
The distribution of patents across market players in a given industry has a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the value of individual patents. Ziedonis (2004) ﬁnds that frag-
mented property rights (i.e. when ownership rights for related, sequential innova-
tions are spread across multiple owners) can cause problems for ﬁrms attempting to
commercialize an innovation, as discussed above. As there are a large number of en-
tities holding related patents, the ﬁrm has a high number of possible sources of hold
up, which can signiﬁcantly increase transactions costs. This can be a particular issue
in industries with a high level of sequential or complementary innovation, as both
horizontal and vertical patent-holders can limit commercialization activity.
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This problem can become more severe when transactions costs for licensing
and patent transfer are high, as otherwise ﬁrms may counter-license and grant effec-
tive technology access and allow . However, transactions costs are high when
In other words, high levels of industry fragmentation greatly increase the de-
fensive value of patents. This is especially true when ﬁrms have high levels of capital
intensity, i.e. when commercialization requires high levels of investment at a given
time. Due to the expensive levels of capital required for commercialization, hold-up
becomes particularly costly and defensive value accordingly higher.
The nature of innovation interdependencies also has signiﬁcant impact upon
patent value. Sequential innovation denotes the situation where an innovation is built
upon another, previous technology such as HTML iterations, which are generally de-
veloped upon previous incarnations of HTML code and structure. Industries with
high levels of sequential innovation have a higher risk of hold-up, as the innovations
that are "downstream" (i.e. which derive from other, older inventions) are susceptible
to litigation by those entities holding patents to upstream inventions. This problem
becomes more severe when property rights are strong, as patent-holders have a higher
chance of winning litigation. Patents to upstream innovations thus have a high level
of both leveraging and defensive value. On the other hand, ﬁrms commercializing
downstream innovations may ﬁnd that upstream innovations beneﬁt from imitation
and substitution, as this allows the commercializing ﬁrm to "invent around" and sub-
stitute for the upstream invention more easily, thus decreasing the holdup and liti-
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gation costs for the downstream invention. This manner of upstream imitation thus
increases the proprietary value of patents downstream (Bessen and Maskin (2009)).
Wang (2008) ﬁnds that extensive patenting of upstream innovations, especially re-
search tools, often impede additional research, impose additional costs and delays.
Wang notes the example of patenting DNA fragments - known as expressed sequence
tags - without knowing their function, causing considerable delays and costs to con-
ducting further commercializable research upon those DNA areas.
3.2.5 Description of Framework
As can be seen above, the ﬁrm’s estimation of patent value is heavily dependent
upon what strategy it chooses to pursue, as well as the legal and market environment.
Consequently, in order to properly align its internal resources with its strategy and
the environment, the ﬁrm must develop several interrelated dynamic capabilities.
The ﬁrst is evaluation ability, or the capacity of ﬁrms to analyze (or re-analyze)
the characteristics of a patent, especially in light of updating ﬁrm goals. The second
is patent redeployment ability, or the capacity of ﬁrms to reorganize and update the
ﬁrm’s existing patent portfolio, assets and processes to match the ﬁrm’s strategy. Last
is the patent acquisition ability, or the capacity of the ﬁrm to ﬁle, purchase, or license
external patents through the market for innovation.
The diagram below provides an outline of how these dynamic capabilities relate
to one another, the ﬁrm’s existing patent portfolio, and the environment.
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The three dynamic capabilities, as can be seen, are interdependent and linked.
The ﬁrm’s evaluation processes provides the information necessary to make the strate-
gic choice on acquisition or deployment – the ﬁrm’s other patent dynamic capabili-
ties then come into play and either realign the ﬁrm’s resources or acquire new patents
- which then enter the ﬁrm’s patent portfolio and become subject to the ﬁrm’s de-
ployment dynamic capabilities in the future. The cycle repeats as ﬁrms continually
re-evaluate their capabilities in changing environments.
We describe the capabilities in detail below. Before going into detail, it is im-
portant to note the unique value that patents represent when compared to the concept
of a resource as traditionally understood in strategy research. Patent value is par-
ticularly dependent on the environment and the ﬁrm’s other capabilities. It varies
signiﬁcantly due to speciﬁc regulations and the legal regimes as well as the patent
    
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holdings of competitors (as well as expiring within a given time frame), and while
they are transferrable they can be utilized in unique ways depending on the ﬁrm’s
other resources (for example, to patch a speciﬁc hole in the patent portfolio or stake
out a commercial claim for a valuable pivot for the ﬁrm’s existing resources). How-
ever perhaps most importantly, unlike other typical resources, patents are an exclu-
sive mechanism, and thus prevent competitors from commercializing certain areas,
conferring competitive advantage by absence.
3.2.6 Patent Evaluation Capability
A ﬁrm must constantly be updating its awareness of its patent portfolio and the
patent market and legal environments, linking understanding of the full values of
its patent portfolio with the demands of the ﬁrm’s strategic goals in the marketplace.
These coordinative processes will allow the ﬁrm to properly comprehend what would
be required of its patent portfolio and whether it needs to acquire new patents in
aligning the ﬁrm’s mission with the stresses of the changing environment.
Conceptually, this is linked to learning mechanisms described by Zollo and
Winter (2002) – the accumulation of experience and the articulation and codiﬁcation
of knowledge allowing the ﬁrm to hone their organizational routines. However, the
current conceptualization of patent evaluation requires a more active strategic input
from the ﬁrm, as the ability to absorb and analyze external information would be itself
embedded in organizational routines and thus become a dynamic capability in and of
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itself. Patent evaluation dynamic capability requires the development of company
skillsets and processes in gathering and processing information, both internally and
externally.
Firms will likely develop this capability over time, i.e. “learning-by-doing”
as they compete within their respective industries, and develop their knowledge pro-
cessing abilities. At the input stage, the ﬁrm must engage in appropriate sensemak-
ing to process the plethora of information on the ﬁrm’s patent portfolio as well as
the surrounding environment, (Weick (1995)) while recognizing new, emergent pat-
terns (Mintzberg (1989)). The ﬁrm must then validate, analyze, codify, present, and
provide access to the information to the rest of the ﬁrm (Dawson (2000)).
While these represent general knowledge-processing capabilities, when applied
to patents, this knowledge takes four primary forms: knowledge of the ﬁrm’s exist-
ing patent characteristics and underlying technology, knowledge of legal processes
and requirements surrounding maintenance and defense of patents, knowledge of the
market’s technological developments, and knowledge of competitors’ patent hold-
ings. Understanding patent characteristics requires familiarization with patent indi-
cators such as citations, claim construction, know-how, as well as interpreting the
fundamental underlying technologies. For the second category, ﬁrms should develop
understanding regarding litigation, defense during patent approval and re-issuings,
potentially by developing an internal legal team or contracting with an external legal
ﬁrm. Knowledge of the third category may develop over time as ﬁrms continue to
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compete in various technological paths. For the last category listed above, ﬁrms will
have to develop familiarity with the critical patent holdings of competitors in major
markets, learning which outside entities hold potentially critical patents and where
they are vulnerable in turn to leveraging strategies. This may occur over time as
ﬁrms develop cross-licensing agreements as they debut new technologies and prod-
ucts - a fairly common occurence in industries such as consumer electronics (e.g.
smart phones).
To this end, ﬁrms may wish to invest in a "patent center" of sorts, which will
specialize in analyzing the market and the relationship of its portfolio with the evolv-
ing market of technologies and products. The knowledge-gathering and analyzing
process is constant, and thus ﬁrms may ﬁnd it advantageous to pursue speciﬁc knowl-
edge management initiatives or expert systems, where expert knowledge is siloed and
captured in speciﬁc groups (Dawson (2000)). Dow Chemical, for example, began its
knowledge management initiatives by attempting to leverage its existing patent port-
folio, while Microsoft maintaines an intellectual property and licensing center. Such
patent centers would also serve as a center to use such knowledge and develop rou-
tines to ﬁle, register, or litigate patents. These patent centers will also be discussed
further in the section on patent deployment capability.
These general knowledge-processing routines should be applied in understand-
ing both the shifts in the external environment – the behavior and strategies of com-
peting ﬁrms, the emergence of new, vital technologies, and changing legal regimes,
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Supreme Court rulings, regulation, etc. – and then re-evaluating the existing patent
portfolio in light of these changes. When the ﬁrm comprehends the potential value
of its patent portfolio and the best way it can advance the ﬁrm’s strategy in the envi-
ronment, the ﬁrm must then make a strategic choice whether to acquire new patents,
attempt to restructure the ﬁrm’s processes and assets to enhance speciﬁc aspects of
the patent value, or both. Another issue is the uncertainty surrounding the true com-
mercial value of a patent’s innovation prior to acquisition (Anton and Yao (2002)).
Unproven technologies bear the risk of becoming commercially unproductive, which
can deter ﬁrms from sourcing external technology when they are in their initial de-
velopment stage (Utterback and Abenathy (1975)). The ﬁrm’s evaluation capabilities
would require a careful analysis of the risks involved in acquiring the patents to any
unproven technologies.
Consequently, the ﬁrm’s patent evaluation ability determines the extent to which
the ﬁrm has the information to make optimal strategic decisions.
Patent Deployment Capability
Upon evaluating its current capabilities and the environment, the ﬁrm
must formulate its strategy and decide whether patents need to be redeployed, or new
patents need to be acquired.
If the ﬁrm chooses to refresh its patents by extracting different types of value,
it will have to rely upon its patent deployment capability. This extends beyond the
reorganization or using old patents which may have fallen into relative underuse –
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rather, the ﬁrm will have to refresh its own assets, knowledge, and processes to ex-
tract different types of value from an otherwise familiar patent. The organizational
routines the ﬁrm develops to allow this kind of switching would form the foundation
of the ﬁrm’s patent deployment dynamic capability.
Speciﬁcally, extracting the commercialization value of patents requires the ﬁrm
to develop their technical and production capabilities to exploit the patent’s underly-
ing technology. The ﬁrm will have to develop both the products using the underlying
technology as well as the mechanisms, processes, know-how, and production capa-
bility to successfully manufacture and sell such productions. Given that patents are
technically public disclosures of such technology, commercialization is generally the
initial value derived from patents (as otherwise the technology will gradually become
obsolete due to its life-cycle). Generally commercialization capabilities would be de-
veloped in tandem with the underlying technology, and though statistics indicate that
50 percent of patents are never commercialized (Morgan et al. (2001)), studies sug-
gest that ﬁrms with higher investment in developing the technology (i.e. more spent
on R&D) would be more likely to commercialize (Svensson (2007)). However, it is
important to emphasize that this model explores speciﬁcally the dynamic commer-
cialization deployment capabilities – that is, how ﬁrms develop the processes and
routines allowing it to quickly shift its resources and redeploy its assets to either
commercialize new technologies, or to extend existing core competencies to new
patent-protected markets instead of focusing on a single production path.
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Maximizing the leveraging and defensive value of patents is dependent on
knowledge of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the ﬁrm’s competitors or other
outside companies. While this falls under the purview of patent evaluation abilities
as discussed above, it is of particular importance in pursuing leveraging and defensive
strategies. One primary mechanism by which the ﬁrm will maximize its patent value
is by expanding its legal capabilities, which entails gathering legal knowledge and
expertise, expert personnel, and developing processes to allow for efﬁcient patent
ﬁling, litigation, defense, hearings, appeals, etc. Such processes, which are gener-
ally somewhat separate from the operations of a product or technology-based ﬁrms,
will likely need to be contained in the patent center as discussed above. The other
additional primary mechanism to maximize leveraging and defensive value derives
from knowledge of the strategic environment, i.e. its competitors, allies, related tech-
nologies, etc. A ﬁrm with stronger legal capabilities and knowledge of competitors’
weaknesses in its defense of its innovations, as well as awareness of competitors’
own patent holdings (which will allow it to litigate the ﬁrm and possibly subject it to
hold-up) will aid the ﬁrm both in gaining leveraging value as well as understanding
the optimal way to defend against potential leveraging strategies from others.
A broad, deep patent portfolio can be advantageous in this situation, as it pro-
vides a wide variety of bargaining "chips" to use in negotiating with competitors, and
again the ﬁrm’s patent knowledge dynamic capabilities will confer signiﬁcant ad-
vantages in allowing ﬁrms to discover critical bargaining points and areas to "lever"
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while negotiating. An extensive patent porfolio also confers defensive advantages to
the ﬁrm, reducing areas that outside ﬁrms can pressure (Ziedonis (2004)). Finally,
ﬁrm reputation can have a signiﬁcant effect - for example, a ﬁrm with a reputation as
being particularly litigious can dissuade competitors from engaging in competitive
bargaining or staking a claim in technology areas where ﬁrms have signiﬁcant patent
holdings.
As discussed earlier, these strategies can be distinguished from the allocation
of resources towards R&D or technological acquisition, especially by the nature of
patents as exclusionary devices. The acquisition and deployment of patents allows
ﬁrms to maintain an legally deﬁned exclusive use of a technology or grant bargaining
power due to the potential threat of litigation over exclusion. As such, the competitive
advantages of the strategies listed arise out of exclusion or pressure against others, as
opposed to granting an intrinsic advantage due to technological capabilities, which
can be developed separately. Technological development and patents can thus not
be considered separately, but the nature of the advantages are separate. The unique
value of patents also allow for ﬁrms that can use them separate from technologies,
namely non-practicing entities or patent trolls.
Interestingly, the ﬁrm can enhance the all types of value of a given patent by ac-
quiring additional ones. A patent portfolio has numerous synergistic beneﬁts. Com-
plementary rights can help provide patent coverage of a multi-innovation spanning
product, while overlapping rights can bolster the defensive value against patents held
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by rival ﬁrms. Wider patent portfolios also give a greater range f potential leveraging
options against competitors, with more opportunities to pursue litigation along dif-
ferent avenues. In addition, a greater knowledge base, reﬂected in patent portfolios,
Veuglers and Cassiman (2002), who argue that investment in internal
Patent Acquisition Capability
When the ﬁrm decides that it currently lacks the patents to pursue its
strategic goals, it relies upon its patent acquisition capabilities to either ﬁle new
patents, or ﬁnd, purchase, or license external patents in the market for innovation.
Once again the ﬁrm must apply its evaluation capabilities to the patent market to un-
derstand the potential costs and difﬁculties it would face in acquiring new patents.
Patent acquisition capabilities thus refers to the extent to which the ﬁrm can quickly
and effectively locate and secure required patents not currently held by the ﬁrm.
There are two primary avenues by which ﬁrms acquire new patents: ﬁling them
or acquiring them in the market for innovation. When ﬁling, the ﬁrm would apply
its legal and technological expertise to construct the patents claims and language in a
way that would render it most effective in terms of its likelihood of standing in court
as well as having breadth of claims.
The ﬁrm’s external patent acquisition capabilities depend upon the ﬁrm’s pro-
cesses and routines for searching for new patents in the marketplace, bargaining with
potential sellers, and ﬁnally its absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal (1990)) -
i.e. the ﬁrm’s ability to absorb external innovations and technologies.
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Finding valuable patents can be expensive and time-consuming, potentially
rendering it impractical to locate all relevant patents before investing product de-
velopment based on a particular innovation (Gans, Hsu, Stern (2008)). Such search
costs are especially signiﬁcant in fast-moving industries where ﬁrst-mover advan-
tages are especially valuable, although development of the ﬁrm’s patent knowledge
capabilities above will potentially result in a signiﬁcant reduction of such search
costs. Certain ﬁrm characteristics, depending on environmental factors, may render
advantages in this area beyond its specialized dynamic capabilities – Ahn, Anton and
Yao (2015) suggests that ﬁrms with higher commercialization capabilities may ben-
eﬁt in strong patent rights industries by rendering them more attractive to approach
from external innovators, with similar beneﬁts according to ﬁrms with weaker com-
mercialization capabilities in industries with weaker patent rights. Although beyond
the scope of this essay, this can have interesting implications for investment in ﬁrm
dynamic capabilities according to the deﬁned conceptual structure, suggesting that
ﬁrms may gain extra beneﬁts from pursuing leveraging and defensive strategies in
weaker property rights scenarios.
Purchasing the patent is also non-trivial and requires development of the ﬁrm’s
bargaining capabilities, although to a certain extent this depends upon market factors
and bargaining power. While ﬁrms can enhance their negotiating capabilities, both
the buyer and the seller of a patent can incur signiﬁcant costs in effecting a sale. If
the buyer has already committed signiﬁcantly to the technology, they are in a weak
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bargaining position, which could raise bargaining costs on the buyer’s side. On the
other hand, sellers bear the risk of having their intellectual property expropriated due
to the paradox of disclosure, where veriﬁcation of the intellectual property’s value
requires disclosure of the underlying innovation - the buyer could then conceivably
use the idea without compensating the potential seller.
A large patent portfolio can again be advantageous in this situation - in addition
to conferring bargaining chips as argued above, the scope of the patent portfolio
naturally renders awareness of a wider array of technologies, reducing search costs.
An extensive portfolio also reﬂects a deep technological knowledge base, which also
confers beneﬁts to the ﬁrm’s absorptive capacities. The beneﬁts of internal R&D
and internally held technologies has found empirical support as well (Veuglers and
Cassiman (2002)). In certain cases, ﬁrms acquire or divest large patent portfolios,
particularly in emerging industries where the value of certain technologies are as yet
unclear, and consequently also the value of patents covering such technologies.
Firms with a reputation as being friendly for innovators can ﬁnd this beneﬁcial
in acquiring external technologies as it attracts intellectual property holders, although
small innovators may actually have a difﬁcult time observing such reputations (Gans
and Stern (2002)).
While the analysis so far has focused upon the patent acquisition decision,
when ﬁrms are pursuing technological commercialization strategies, they may ﬁnd
it preferable to license the technology underlying a patent (held by another ﬁrm) in-
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stead of purchasing or "inventing around" existing technologies. This may be due to
several reasons - for instance, the current patent holder may be unwilling to relinquish
ownership, or set the cost of purchase is prohibitively high. In fact, depending on how
prohibitive the transactions costs are for determining licensing agreements (factors of
which include the ease of expropriation, the ease of litigation, the extent to which the
patent regime is pro-patent holder, as well as ﬁrm-speciﬁc bargaining characteristics),
ﬁrms may ﬁnd it more commercially viable to leverage existing value chains and
capture value via technology rather than competing head-to-head. Netscape, for in-
stance, initially considered a technology licensing relationship with Microsoft before
committing to competing directly with Microsoft’s Internet Explore browser. A num-
ber of ﬁrms in the pharmaceutical space also focus speciﬁcally upon licensing their
drug delivery technologies, such as Penwest Pharmaceutical’s TIMERx delayed-drug
delivery system.
On the other hand, while licensing grants access to the underlying technology,
usually at the cost of some royalties, it does not typically grant ownership privileges
unless otherwise speciﬁed. Patent licensees, therefore, typically lose access to the
leveraging value of patents and to a certain extent, defensive value. Further, the
licensee bears the risk that the licensor may terminate the contract and holdup the
licensee’s rents, or that the licensor may license the same technology to competitors,
resulting in imitation that cannot be litigated. Court rulings on patent infringement
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cases also sometimes result in licensing agreements with reasonable royalties (Anton
and Yao (2007)).
Consequently,licensingprovidescommercializationvalueandtoacertainex-
tent,defensivevalue(whichisalsodiminished-thedefensivelegalresponsibilities
typicallyremainswiththepatent-holder),butleveragingvalueislow.
3.2.7 PatentDynamicCapabilitiesandtheTechnologyLifeCycle
Weextendtheaboveframeworkwiththetheoryofthetechnologicallife-cycle,
pioneered byHenderson (1995). The technology life-cycle theory argues that all
technologyfollowsafour-stageprocess(alsoknownas the technology“S-curve”).
After an initial period ofR&Dwhere the innovation is an investment sink rather
thanasourceofvalue,thetechnologyenterstheascentphase,whereinitialcostsare
recoveredandthetechnologybeginstogatheracceptanceandimplementation.Even-
tuallythetechnologyreachesthematurityphase,whereitisreadilyactionableand
oftenspreadthroughthemarketplace–itisakeyvaluedriver. Finallythetechnol-
ogydeclinesastheinnovationbecomesoutdatedandthetechnologygraduallyuses
itsutility.
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Thisgeneralconcepthasseenmuchtractionwithinthemanagementandstrat-
egyliterature.Klepper(1996)describesasimilarlife-cycleamongproducts,which
areoftendrivenbysuchtechnologies,wherebycompetitorsgraduallyadoptaproduct
atanincreasingpaceuntilcompetitiondrivesouthigh-costproducersintomaturity
(and theproductbecomesoutdated). Whenextended toan industrialscale,wesee
agenerallysimilarprocess,describedas“punctuatedequilibrium”byTushmanand
Anderson(1986).Whengroundbreakingtechnologiesfirstemerge,theyarefollowed
byawaveofincreasingincrementalinnovationsthatgraduallypeteroutuntilthenext
breakthrough.Wecangenerallyunderstandthatindustriesbuiltaroundtechnologies
generallyfollowthesamecycleofdevelopment,growth,peak,anddecline.
Conjecture 5 In rapidly changing technological regimes, including deepening of
the technological chain of dependencies (i.e. upstream and downstream innova-
tions) commercialization value is particularly signiﬁcant for product-developing
ﬁrms. Acquisition dynamic capabilities are favored.
In rapidly evolving technological regimes (e.g. immediately after the devel-
opment of a breakthrough technology, or in the growth phase of a technology or
industry), ﬁrms in the market compete with one another to capture new technologies
and “stake their claims” using patents. Particularly as fundamental innovations are
developed and the chain of future innovations begins to build upon these, acquiring
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patents for critical upstream technologies becomes essential for maintaining a com-
petitive advantage as the industry develops further. Consequently, ﬁrm efforts will be
focused upon acquiring new technologies and their patents. Strategic behavior would
thus emphasize the patent acquisition dynamic capability. 10
Conjecture 6 In industries with changing patent market structure, particularly
with patent thickets, fragmentation the importance of defensive and leveraging
value rises. Deployment and acquisition are both favored, with acquisition more
favored for larger ﬁrms.
When industrial changes are not being driven by rapid technological progress,
the ﬁrm’s competitive advantages are driven less by claiming patents to critical tech-
nologies. Rather, ﬁrms should shift their strategies to focus upon bolstering their
defense and improving their bargaining position vis-à-vis external ﬁrms.
Especially when patent market structure is changing, the ﬁrm will respond by
evolving its existing patent portfolio. Given an industry-level change in patent regula-
tion, ﬁrms can potentially acquire new patents en masse via acquisitions or portfolio
auctions. However, most ﬁrms may ﬁnd this activity prohibitively expensive and thus
pursue optimizing the value of its patent base by applying their deployment dynamic
capabilities.
In such settings we should therefore expect to see greater emphasis upon ex-
10 These environments also provide, of course, ample opportunities for patent trolls, who may also
scramble to acquire patents to litigate the other, product development ﬁrms. For these ﬁrms, acquisi-
tion would also be the strategic focus.
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tracting defense and leveraging value, emerging from a combination of acquisition
and deployment dynamic capabilities, especially among smaller ﬁrms.
Based on these two conjectures, we develop a hypothesis for shifting dynamic
capabilities over the product life cycle as follows:
Conjecture 7 Firms’ patent dynamic capabilities gradually shift over time from
acquisition to redeployment capabilities. (However patent evaluation capabili-
ties remain always relevant)
Over time, as technologies evolve and mature into the life cycle, industry struc-
ture and thickets eventually become “calciﬁed” around existing technologies. As the
rate of new technologies taper off, ﬁrms begin to compete by applying their given
patent portfolios in bargaining, defense, and leveraging. Consequently, there over
the course of the technological (or industrial) lifecycle, there is a continual itera-
tive process of reevaluating existing patents and a gradual shift from commercial to
defensive and leveraging strategies.
We should therefore expect to see greater investment in litigation and deploy-
ment dynamic capabilities – or rather, that ﬁrms with such capabilities compete more
successfully over time instead of those that invested only in acquisition capabilities.
This may especially be true for established ﬁrms in the marketplace developed around
"fundamental" technologies when the market was initially established (or disrupted)
- such ﬁrms are especially dependent on their patents to maintain their advantages.
Some ﬁrms - for example ﬁrms that operate providing speciﬁc services to other estab-
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lished, technologically based-ﬁrms, or ﬁrms that develop speciﬁcied, narrow down-
stream technologies may still ﬁnd that commercialization strategies are favored, or
otherwise not necessarily altogether.
Once again it is important to note that the driver of this shift in strategically op-
timal ﬁrms is the evaluation capabilities. Firms that are able to discern the evolving
nature of the market and its innovations would be in a position to alter its strategy ac-
cording to the times – however, it is dependent on the ﬁrm’s applicatory (acquisition
and deployment) dynamic capabilities to actually transform the ﬁrm’s resources into
properly using its patents.
3.3 Conclusion
This essay develops a conceptual framework to describe the framework by which
ﬁrms can develop dynamic capabilities and optimize their patent portfolio value in
response to its changing goals and its environments. Critically, this is dependent upon
the insight that patents have multiple types of value – their strategic value evolves
over time, and ﬁrms sho uld be aware of this and respond accordingly.
The conceptual model makes several potentially valuable contributions. First,
it provides some insight into how ﬁrms can develop various internal processes to de-
velop the ﬁrm patent’s dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capabilities, while generally
acknowledged to be a deep and valuable insight into the reasons behind the contin-
uing competitive dominance of certain ﬁrms, is sometimes criticized for being po-
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tentially tautological or that it does not provide deeper, more speciﬁc insights. By
introducing insights from the patents literature, including discussions on the differ-
ent ways on which patents provide value and how they are affected by the environ-
ment, we are able to suggest more granular processes that would actually comprise
a ﬁrm’s dynamic capability, as well as suggesting the different categories in which it
can manifest. We also extended it using the technology life-cycle theory, providing a
potentially testable theory or prescriptive path of development for practitioners.
Future research may potentially ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to extend the model further by
introducing greater depth into the currently high-level notion of ﬁrm strategic goals.
For instance, we may be able to apply Porter’s generic strategy (Porter (1980)) to
discover the different ways in which the different patent dynamic capabilities come
to the fore – or further, to develop even more speciﬁc descriptions of a ﬁrm’s patent
dynamic capabilities. Ideally the theory should be connected with practice, corrobo-
rating insights and predictions with evidence and explanations from practitioners.
102
References
[1] Ahn, Pyoungchan J. and Dennis A. Yao "The Dynamics of Intellectual Prop-
erty Sales and Property Rights Regimes." Working paper, Harvard Business
School (2015)
[2] Allison, John R., and Mark. A. Lemley. "Empirical Evidence on the Validity
of Litigated Patents." AIPLA Quarterly Journal 26.3: 185-275
[3] Anton, James J., and Dennis A. Yao "Expropriation and Inventions: Appro-
priable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights." The American Economic
Review 84.1 (1994): 190-209
[4] Anton, James J., and Dennis A. Yao. "The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclo-
sure, Property Rights, and Contracting." Review of Economic Studies 69.3
(2002): 513-31.
[5] Anton, James J., and Dennis A. Yao. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Man-
aging Intellectual Property." The RAND Journal of Economics 35.1 (2004):
1
[6] Argote, Linda, Bill Mcevily, and Ray Reagans. "Introduction to the Special
Issue on Managing Knowledge in Organizations: Creating, Retaining, and
Transferring Knowledge." Management Science 49.4 (2003)
[7] Arora, Ashish, and Andrea Fosfuri. "Licensing the Market for Technology."
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 52.2 (2003): 277-95.
[8] Arora, Ashish, Andrea Fosfuri, and Alfonso Gambardella. "Markets for Tech-
nology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy". Cambridge,
MA: MIT, 2002. Print.
[9] Arrow, Kenneth. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for In-
vention." The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social
Factors. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962. 609-626. Print.
[10] Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg. "Market Value and
Patent Citations." The RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring,
2005), pp. 16-38
103
[11] Cassiman, Bruno, and Reinhilde Veugelers. "R&D Cooperation and Spillovers:
Some Empirical Evidence from Belgium." American Economic Review 92.4
(2002): 1169-184.
[12] Cohen, Wesley M., and Daniel A. Levinthal. "Absorptive Capacity: A New
Perspective on Learning and Innovation." Administrative Science Quarterly
35.1 (1990): 128.
[13] Cohen, Wesley, Richard Nelson, and John Walsh. "Protecting Their Intellec-
tual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms
Patent (or Not)." Working paper, NBER (2000)
[14] Duysters, Geert, and John Hagedoorn. "Core Competences and Company
Performance in the World-wide Computer Industry." The Journal of High
Technology Management Research 11.1 (2000): 75-91.
[15] Encaoua, David, and Yassine Lefouili. "Choosing Intellectual Protection:
Imitation, Patent Strength and Licensing." Annales d’Economie et de Statis-
tique, 79: 241-271.
[16] Fischer, Timo, and Jan Leidinger. "Testing Patent Value Indicators on Di-
rectly Observed Patent Value—An Empirical Analysis of Ocean Tomo Patent
Auctions." Research Policy 43.3 (2014): 519-29.
[17] Galasso, Alberto, Mark Schankerman, and Carlos J. Serrano. "Trading and
Enforcing Patent Rights." The RAND Journal of Economics 44.2 (2013):
275-312.
[18] Gallini, Nancy T. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S.
Patent Reform." Journal of Economic Perspectives 16.2 (2002): 131-54.
[19] Gans, Joshua S., and Scott Stern. "The Product Market and the Market for
"ideas": Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs." Re-
search Policy 32.2 (2003): 333-50.
[20] Greene, William H., and R. Carter. Hill. "Maximum Simulated Likelihood
Methods and Applications". Bingley, U.K.: Emerald, 2010. Print.
[21] Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam B. Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. 2001. "The
NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological
Tools," NBER Working Paper No. 8498.
104
[22] Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg. "Market Value and
Patent Citations." The RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring,
2005), pp. 16-38
[23] Jaffe, Adam B. "The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation
and the Innovation Process." Research Policy 29.4-5 (2000): 531-57.
[24] Lerner, Josh, and Jean Tirole. "Efﬁcient Patent Pools." American Economic
Review 94.3 (2004): 691-711.
[25] Lerner, Josh, and Robert P. Merges. "The Control of Technology Alliances:
An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry." The Journal of In-
dustrial Economics 46.2 (1998): 125-56.
[26] Linden G., Somaya D. 2003. "System-on-a-Chip Integration in the Semi-
conductor Industry: Industry Structure and Firm Strategies." Industrial and
Corporate Change, 12: 545-576.
[27] Lunney, Glynn S. "Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court:
A Quiet Revolution." Supreme Court Economic Review 11 (2004): 1-80.
[28] Mansﬁeld, Edwin, Mark Schwartz, and Samuel Wagner. "Imitation Costs
and Patents: An Empirical Study." The Economic Journal 91.364 (1981):
907.
[29] Moore, Kimberly A. "Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek
Inside the Black Box." Michigan Law Review 99.2 (2000): 365-409
[30] Moore, Kimberly A. "Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction
More Predictable." Lewis and Clark Law Review 9.1 (2005): 231-247
[31] Reitzig, Markus. "What Determines Patent Value?: Insights from the Semi-
conductor Industry." Research Policy 32.1 (2003): 13-26.
[32] Sease, Edmund J. "Markman Misses the Mark, Miserably." University of
Illinois Journal of Law, Technology, and Policy 2004.1 (2004): 99-104
[33] Serrano, Carlos J. "The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal of Patents."
The RAND Journal of Economics 41.4 (2010): 686-708.
[34] Serrano, Carlos J. "The Market for Intellectual Property: Evidence from the
Transfer of Patents," Working paper, University of Toronto. (2005)
105
[35] Shane, Scott, and Deepak Somaya. "The Effects of Patent Litigation on Uni-
versity Licensing Efforts." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
63: 739-755.
[36] Shapiro, Carl. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard Setting." Innovation Policy and the Economy. Vol. 1. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 119-50. Print.
[37] Somaya, Deepak. "Patent Strategy and Management: An Integrative Review
and Research Agenda." Journal of Management, 38 (2012): 1084-1114.
[38] Stern, Scott. (1995), "Incentives and Focus in University and Industrial Re-
search: The Case of Synthetic Insulin," in N. Rosenberg (ed.), "Sources of
Medical Technology: Universities and Industry". Washington D.C., U.S.A:
National Academy Press, 1995. 157-187.
[39] Teece, David J. "Strategies for Managing Knowledge Assets: The Role of
Firm Structure and Industrial Context." Long Range Planning 33.1 (2000):
35-54.
[40] Teece, David J. "Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource
Cost of Transferring Technological Know-How." The Economic Journal 87.346
(1977): 242.
[41] Teece, David J. "Transactions Cost Economics and the Multinational Enter-
prise An Assessment." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 7.1
(1986): 21-45.
[42] Teece, David J., Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen. "Dynamic Capabilities and
Strategic Management." Strategic Management Journal 18.7 (1997): 509-
33.
[43] Tushman, Michael L., and Philip Anderson. "Technological Discontinuities
and Organizational Environments." Administrative Science Quarterly 31.3
(1986): 439.
[44] Ziedonis, Rosemarie Ham. "Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for
Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms." Management
Science 50.6 (2004): 804-20.
106
